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The safety of machinery influences the health and safety of numerous workers globally. 
Clearly, the safety of machinery is not at required level since machinery-related acci-
dents still take place. Due to the poor design of the safety of machinery the workers are 
exposed to hazards. The design of machinery should be improved in order to prevent 
accidents. In the first place, the machinery should be designed to be inherently safe. One 
way to improve the safety of an existing machine is to modernize the machine. 
This thesis analyzed the safety of a machine which was operated by Ahlstrom-Munksjö 
Tampere Oy. The research provided information on safety modernization of the ma-
chine, concentrating on one area of the machine which has been rather difficult to im-
prove. The research method combined a constructive approach and a risk assessment 
method presented by the standard ISO 12100 Safety of Machinery and it was supple-
mented by the technical report ISO/TR 14121-2 Safety of Machinery aiming at finding 
the problems and corresponding solutions. 
Safety deficiencies and hazards were occurring especially within the rotating elements 
of the machinery. The proposed solutions to reduce the risks related to the hazards in-
cluded improving safeguards, mainly guards which deny access to the hazardous zone. 
Almost all the risks were eliminated or reduced by proposed solutions. 
The research studied only one limited area of the machine and investigation of the 
whole machine was not on the scope. The implementation of proposed solutions was 
also excluded from the scope. The effectiveness of the solutions in reality should be 
assessed after the implementation.  
The research provided a method to combine several different aspects and to conduct 
relevant information regarding design of machinery in modernization. It made sure that 
task based hazards are assessed systematically. This method was transferable to other 
plants, industries and machineries where human–machine interface existed. 
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Koneiden turvallisuus vaikuttaa lukuisten työntekijöiden terveyteen ja 
työturvallisuuteen maailmanlaajuisesti. Koneiden turvallisuus ei ole riittävällä tasolla, 
sillä koneista johtuvia tapaturmia tapahtuu edelleen. Työntekijät altistuvat koneiden 
vaaroille koneiden puutteellisen turvallisuussuunnittelun takia. Tapaturmien 
ehkäisemiseksi koneiden suunnittelua on parannettava. Ensisijaisesti koneet olisi 
suunniteltava luontaisesti turvallisiksi. Koneen modernisointi on yksi tapa parantaa 
olemassa olevan koneen turvallisuutta. 
Diplomityö tutki Ahlstrom-Munksjö Tampere Oy:n tuotantokoneen turvallisuutta. Työ 
tuotti tarvittavaa tietoa koneen turvallisuusmodernisointia varten keskittyen koneen 
osaan, jota on ollut erityisen hankala kehittää. Tutkimusmenetelmä yhdisti 
konstruktiivista lähestymistapaa ja ISO 12100 -koneturvallisuusstandardin esittelemää 
riskienarviointia, jota täydennettiin koneturvallisuuden ISO/TR 14121-2 -teknisen 
raportin tiedoilla. Tutkimusmenetelmä tähtäsi ongelmien ja niihin soveltuvien 
ratkaisujen löytämiseen. 
Turvallisuuspuutteita ja vaaroja esiintyi erityisesti koneen pyöriviin osiin liittyen. 
Ehdotetut ratkaisut riskien vähentämiseen sisälsivät suojausteknisiä toimenpiteitä, 
pääasiassa suojuksia, jotka estävät pääsyn vaara-alueelle. Ratkaisut poistivat tai 
vähensivät lähes kaikki tunnistetut riskit. 
Diplomityö tutki vain yhtä rajallista aluetta, eikä konetta tutkittu kokonaisuutena. 
Diplomityö ei myöskään ulottunut ehdotettujen ratkaisujen toteutukseen. Ratkaisujen 
vaikuttavuutta käytännössä pitäisi tutkia niiden toteutuksen jälkeen.  
Diplomityö esitteli tavan yhdistää useita erilaisia näkökulmia ja tarpeita ja muodostaa 
niistä tarvittavaa tietoa koneen modernisoinnin suunnitteluun. Tällä tavalla työtehtäviin 
liittyvät vaarat voitiin arvioida järjestelmällisesti. Metodi toimii myös muille tehtaille, 
teollisuuden aloille ja koneille, joissa on ihminen–kone -vuorovaikutus. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The safety of machinery influences the health of numerous workers globally. On aver-
age, more than 6’000 workers die every day due to the work they are doing (Hämä-
läinen 2010). Even though the minority of these fatalities originates from machines, 
machinery-related accidents in industry cause remarkable and negative consequences on 
people’s health (Backström & Döös 1997; Jocelyn et al. 2016). In addition, occupation-
al accidents have an impact on organizations and societies by decreasing productivity 
(Hämäläinen 2010) and increasing costs (Schulte et al. 2008; Aaltonen et al. 1996). By 
legislation many countries try to decrease the occupational injuries and their negative 
effects and guarantee safe work places for workers. In spite of the binding legislation, 
there are machines in use in the work places which do not reach the required level of 
safety (Malm & Hämäläinen 2006) and cause fatal accidents (Kivistö-Rahnasto 2009) 
or severe non-fatal accidents (Lind 2008). At least in the member states of the European 
Union (EU), it is the employers’ responsibility to ensure that machines in use comply 
with the legislation of today (D 89/391/EEC). In the first place, machines should be 
designed to be safe (SFS-EN ISO 12100:2010) but once it is not possible anymore for 
an old machine, one way to improve the safety of an existing machine is to modernize 
the machine (Malm & Hämäläinen 2006). 
This thesis is made in cooperation with Ahlstrom-Munksjö Tampere Oy. The company 
operates a machine which produces nonwoven with a wet-laid technique. The machine 
is almost 4 decades old, therefore, old age sets demands for upgrading and modernizing 
it from time to time. Many parts of the machine have been updated through the years; 
yet its purpose of use has remained the same. The modernization of the machine is nec-
essary again, especially in one area of the machine which has been rather difficult to 
improve. A recent safety audit confirmed issues in the safeguarding and an action plan 
was set. One relevant aspect to be improved is the safety of the machine, as the devel-
opment of technology enables safer solutions than in the past (Malm & Hämäläinen 
2006). Also, Ahlstrom-Munksjö Oyj, to which Ahlstrom-Munksjö Tampere Oy belongs, 
has globally been focusing on unifying the practices of its factories regarding the safety 
and safeguards of the machinery during the latest years. 
This thesis provides information to Ahlstrom-Munksjö Tampere Oy regarding the safety 
modernization of the machine. The scope of this thesis is the safety of machinery focus-
ing on safety modernization and safeguards. The objectives of the thesis are (1) to iden-
tify safety requirements, regarding the modernization of the chosen area of the machine, 
especially concentrating on safeguards, (2) to identify deficiencies and hazards related 
to the safety of this area of the machine and (3) to propose solutions to meet these re-
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quirements and reduce the risks related to the hazards. The objectives will be achieved 
by a mixed research strategy combining a constructive approach with a risk assessment 
method presented by the standard ISO 12100 Safety of Machinery and supplemented by 
the technical report ISO/TR 14121-2 Safety of Machinery. The analyzed machine is 
located in Finland; consequently, the statutory requirements for the machine are based 
on Finnish legislation. The modernization of the work equipment, which is in use, is 
under the Government Decree (12.6.2008/403), which provides requirements on safe 
use and inspection of work equipment, and a CE marking normally required for ma-
chines is not applicable since the machine has been commissioned before the year 1995 
(A 12.6.2008/400). 
The results of this thesis make sure that risks related to task based hazards in the chosen 
area of the machine are systematically assessed and they will be used as a basis for safe-
ty modernization. The results help the company to further improve the safety of the ma-
chine and of the working environment, which is also part of the company’s continual 
improvement process. The chosen area of the machine is especially complex when it 
comes to integrating usage of the machine, safeguarding, variation of different products 
and all the requirements these issues set. Therefore, the requirements of operations of 
the machine are an important aspect to be taken into account while modernizing the 
machine and users of the machine play a big role as a source of information. 
There are some limitations in this research. It studies only one limited area of the ma-
chine and investigation of the whole machine is not on the scope. The technical design 
and implementation of proposed solutions and safeguards are excluded, too. However, 
the results of the thesis are verified by comparing them to possible technical design and 
execution which were outsourced of this thesis. The reassessment of risks related to the 
machine and its working environment will be carried out only after the implementation 
of the results and safeguards. The company will continue utilizing the results later on. 
The framework for this thesis is provided in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 represents Object and 
Execution of the Research and demonstrates step by step the phases of the research. The 
results of the research are gathered and analyzed in Chapter 4 about each phase of the 
research. A discussion is presented in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 is the Conclusion of the the-
sis. Lastly, Appendix A shows an Open Questionnaire for Personnel used within this 
thesis, and Appendixes B and C includes Tables for Applicable Safety Requirements of 
the Government Decree (12.6.2008/403) and Risk Assessment. 
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2. FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Hazards and Safety of Machinery 
Machineries cause hazards to multiple people: to those who use them, to those who are 
not using them but are nearby for different work-related reasons and even to those ex-
ternal people who have nothing to do with the machinery but just happen to be close by. 
Hazards of machinery should be minimized and machineries should be designed and 
made safe in order to reduce negative effects which machinery can cause. “Safety of 
machinery” can be seen as an ability of a machine to carry out safely all the functions 
that the machine is designed to carry out during its life cycle. It presumes that risks re-
lated to the hazards of the machine are reduced adequately. (SFS-EN ISO 12100:2010) 
Hazards especially related to machineries are divided into different categories, such as 
mechanical, electrical, thermal, noise, vibration, radiation, material, ergonomic hazards, 
and hazards associated with the environment in which the machine is used. Additional-
ly, different kinds of combinations of these hazards are always possible as well. Hazard 
is defined as a “potential source of harm” and harm as a “physical injury or damage to 
health” in the standard of Safety of Machinery. With each hazard, there is a hazardous 
zone. When a person or a body part of a person is in the hazardous zone, hazardous sit-
uations and hazardous events can occur and the person is exposed to the hazard. This 
may lead to harm. It can either happen suddenly, such as an accident, or in case of a 
long-term exposure, such as a loss of hearing which gradually appears. Hazards and 
hazardous zones can exist permanently somewhere or they can appear occasionally, 
which might complicate discovering them and increase the possibility of harm. (SFS-
EN ISO 12100:2010) Several definitions of what risk is can be found, however, usually 
probability of potential consequences of some activity and severity of these conse-
quences are involved in the definition of risk. Potential consequences can, for instance, 
mean harm to a person’s health. (Aven 2008; SFS-EN ISO 12100:2010; Gauthier & 
Charron 2002) 
A poor design of machines causes accidents (Driscoll et al. 2008; Chinniah 2015) and 
the design of machines should be improved in order to prevent accidents (Bluff 2014; 
Backström & Döös 1997). Safety aspects of the machinery should be taken into account 
during the design phase (Gauthier & Charron 2002). Designing a machinery to be in-
herently safe is the most efficient way to develop the safety of machinery (SFS-EN ISO 
12100:2010; Aven 2008). However, producing safe machinery is not an unambiguous 
issue. Gathering information about experiences of using machines and related accidents 
would be a good feedback in order to improve the design of machines but gathering 
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such information has proven to be rather difficult (Jocelyn et al. 2016). Accidents take 
place regardless of safeguards and other safety measures (Chinniah 2015; Backström & 
Döös 2000; Aneziris et al. 2013). In Chinniah’s study (2015) the major reason for acci-
dents related to machines was that moving parts were accessible; for instance there were 
problems with safeguarding and a lack of them. Bluff’s study (2014) revealed that most 
of the studied manufacturers of machinery either failed to inform the users of the ma-
chine about related hazards or had not pledged safe design and construction of their ma-
chineries. 
Lind (2008) reckoned that machine safety design might have advanced even though 
accidents still occur while working at running processes. Backström & Döös (2000) 
considered that, in spite of the improvement of safety of automated installations, acci-
dents come up with machine movements especially. The users of the machinery can be 
exposed to the movements of the machine either while the machine is ON or while the 
machine is turned OFF and it suddenly starts unexpectedly (Aneziris et al. 2013). Vari-
ous reasons might cause unexpected and unintended start-ups, for example a failure of 
start command or a release of energy that was stored into the machinery after an inter-
ruption. The design of the machinery has an effect on and can prevent unexpected start-
ups (SFS-EN ISO 12100:2010) but also safe working methods and procedures are im-
portant with the machinery. The user of the machinery, too, has chances to make the 
usage of the machinery safer: unintended start-ups can be prevented by using the Lock 
Out/Tag Out (LOTO) procedure when maintaining the machine. With the LOTO proce-
dure, the disconnection of energies from the machine is guaranteed by isolating the en-
ergies and physically locking isolating devices. (Aneziris et al. 2013)  
Chinniah (2015) proposed key actions to prevent accidents: to carry out a risk assess-
ment, to use guards to protect hazardous zones, to ensure that the lockout procedure is 
used, to train employees properly and to prevent the bypassing of safeguards. According 
to Aneziris et al. (2013) the most efficient way to prevent fatality risk is by the function-
ing emergency stop switch and for non-fatal injuries the efficient prevention action is to 
respect the hazardous zone around the moving parts of the machinery. If the machinery 
was designed so that it is impossible for people to access the hazardous zone, it could 
prevent accidents: no exposure to hazard, no harm. Still, accidents can occur in several 
phases of the life cycle of the machine, and all these phases should also be taken into 
account while designing the machine. (SFS-EN ISO 12100:2010) However, possibilities 
to influence the safety of already existing machines are limited: it is only during the 
designing phase of a machine that all possibilities to make changes exist and that one 
can design the machine to be inherently safe (Aven 2008). 
To improve and maintain the safety of an existing machine, it is possible to modernize 
the machine. Modernization means remodeling or reforming the machinery so that its 
life cycle continues without changing its purpose of use. The modernization can for in-
stance focus on improving the quality, the safety, the reliability of a system or on in-
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creasing its capacity and productivity. Naturally, a modernization should never weaken 
the safety level of the machinery. (Malm & Hämäläinen 2006) When designing the 
modernization for a machine in EU member states, the best available safety level and 
technology, “state of art”, has to be known and taken into account (D 89/391/EEC). The 
standard ISO 12100 regarding the safety of machinery and other harmonized standards 
help to meet an up-to-date level of the machinery safety (Työsuojeluhallinto 2009). 
Moreover, a successful modernization of machinery requires proper information on the 
characteristics of the machine, its use, working methods and requirements set by opera-
tions and environment. One of the major reasons causing unsuccessful projects related 
to modernization of machinery has been inadequate requirement specification. (Malm & 
Hämäläinen 2006) 
The European Union provides the legislation regarding the machinery and safety of ma-
chinery for its Member States (European Commission 2017a). In addition to the EU, 
other countries such as the USA have set law and standards to assure and develop occu-
pational safety, including the safety of machinery (Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration 2017). These different kinds of legislation and standards are provided by a 
legislator, however, they are not direct findings of researches. Manufacturers and other 
agents who operate on the markets covered by the legislation have to comply with them. 
It is mandatory to follow binding legislation. (Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration 2017; European Commission 2017a) Nevertheless, it is not always easy to 
completely comply with the rules. The designer of a machine is obliged to design the 
machine to be safe both within its intended use and foreseeable misuse (D 2006/42/EC) 
but it can be very difficult for the designer to foresee all the possible circumstances that 
can effect on the use and safety of the machine: circumstances vary. Also, people do not 
always comply with the guidance and instructions. The users of the machinery might 
even defeat or remove safeguards if it makes their work easier. (Backström & Döös 
2000) That is why it is essential to try to anticipate the misuse of a machine. As long as 
there is human–machine interface, there is a possibility for human-based error that 
might lead to unsafe circumstances. Therefore, one remarkable issue within the human–
machine interface which has to be understood is the human performance and its cogni-
tive aspects (Hallbert et al. 2010) as well as stress-related and ergonomic aspects (SFS-
EN ISO 12100:2010). 
2.2 On Risk Management of Technical Systems 
Operational risks are one of the main categories of risk management. Operational risks 
impact on normal operational situations in organizations or enterprises and might be 
endangering them. Among other things, accidental events, failures, quality deviations, 
sabotage and loss of key personnel are operational risks. These are essential issues to be 
managed within technical systems, in which accidental events might include potential 
for great loss. The risk management consists of multiple elements. Some of the elements 
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are drawn in the Figure 1. To manage risks successfully, organizations need strategies 
and activities on various levels. Roles and responsibilities should be established. The 
risk assessment includes different phases such as a risk analysis and a risk evaluation. 
The risk treatment comes after the risk assessment, when risks are known and it is pos-
sible to implement the required measures to modify the risks. Modifying can include for 
instance avoiding, reducing, transferring or retaining risks. (Aven 2008) 
 
Figure 1. Multiple Elements of Risk Management (Aven 2008) 
The risk analysis is a useful and usually essential part of the risk management. By way 
of the risk analysis, organizations can conduct information to support decision-making 
during the whole life cycle of a system. For instance decisions on costs and investments 
in relation to safety might ask for such information that a risk analysis can provide. Risk 
analyses are useful to compile risks related to systems, recognize different and critical 
factors, conditions, activities and components effecting on risks, and assess the effects 
of different measures on risks. This will help to choose from different alternatives of 
design, measures or solutions to achieve an eligible conclusion within considered issues. 
(Aven 2008) 
The risk analysis can help decrease costs regarding the design and redesign of a system. 
Once the system, such as a production facility or a machine, is on a planning phase, 
there still are multiple options available and flexibility to change the plans for execu-
tion. In this phase the risk analysis will provide valuable information. For instance, 
some considered solutions might include higher costs or a wider range of safety hazards 
than another solution. During the planning phase it is less costly to make these decisions 
or redesign than in the construction phase, not to mention the operational phase, during 
which it may not even be possible to make changes anymore. The possibilities to affect 
to the design are lesser once the system is already constructed. (Aven 2008) 
The aim of the risk analysis is to identify and describe possible risks. To be able to iden-
tify risks, the hazards that can lead to these risks have to be known. The hazard identifi-
cation is a basis for that. There are various methods to be used for the hazard identifica-
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tion, such as Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Hazard and Operability 
(HAZOP) studies, Structured What-If Technique (SWIFT), Fault tree analysis, Event 
tree analysis, Bayesian networks and Monte Carlo simulation. The objectives of the risk 
analysis have an effect on the choice of the method. Each method demands for some 
input and source data that can be for example general experience, inspections, databases 
and assumptions. The outcome of the hazard identification is a list of undesirable 
events, hazardous events which can finally lead to the realization of risk. Causal and 
consequence analyses are used to supplement situations as a whole. To achieve a com-
prehensive list of risks it is critical to perform the analysis systematically in a structured 
way and, also, to ensure that the people involved are qualified enough in knowing the 
assessed system. To describe and estimate possible risks, their probabilities and values 
are assessed. There are several ways to assess them. It is essential to notice that one 
hazard or hazardous event might lead to multiple different consequences. It depends on 
the chosen method, if multiple consequences are assessed. (Aven 2008) 
There are multiple dimensions used in different methods. The probability of an undesir-
able event and the possible consequences of that event are often used dimensions. To 
state dimensions, terms are used, such as “there is a certain percentage probability that 
event occurs within 5 years”, or consequences will cause “a first aid injury for one per-
son”. It is better to use precise terms rather than too general terms that can be under-
stood widely, such as the probability for occurrence of some event is “often”. (Aven 
2008) 
Risk analysis methods can either adopt a forward or backward approach (Aven 2008). 
In a forward approach, also called a bottom-up approach, the risks are assessed from a 
starting point or hazard to the undesired event or harm. A backward approach, also 
called a top-down approach, studies risks the other way around: from the undesired 
event or harm to their starting points, trying to find all the reasons that can cause these 
undesired events or harm. Usually, checklists are used within the backward approach, 
which might cause situation in which some hazards stay unidentified due to an incom-
plete checklist. This can be avoided by thinking creatively outside of checklists (SFS-
EN ISO 12100:2010) and by gathering a team that is experienced and has competence 
over objects of the risk analysis. Forward approach is more comprehensive than the 
backward approach but also more time-consuming. (Aven 2008) 
2.3 Legislation of Safety of Machinery in the European Union 
The European Union provides legislation for its Member States. Part of the set legisla-
tion is binding for all Member States, for instance regulations and directives. (European 
Union 2017a) Regarding the safety of machinery the European Union has set a Machin-
ery Directive (2006/42/EC) to harmonize health and safety requirements for machiner-
ies in the European Union (European Commission 2017a) and in the European Econom-
ic Area (EEA) (European Commission 2017b). The EU obligates all Member States to 
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comply with the Directive and to implement it into a national legislation (European Un-
ion 2015).  
The aims of the Directive are to guarantee a high level protection against hazards caused 
by machinery for European Union citizens and workers and to advance the free move-
ment of machinery on the EU market. The Machinery Directive is set by the European 
Parliament and the Council, and its latest version became applicable in 2009. (European 
Commission 2017a) The Machinery Directive regulates machines when they are first 
put on the market or commissioned for the first time, which means usually manufactur-
ing new machines and modifying already commissioned machines so that their purpose 
of use changes. Manufacturers, importers and other organs providing machines on the 
EU market or modifying machines are liable for guaranteeing that all the requirements 
of the Machinery Directive are fulfilled. (European Commission 2010) 
In general, the assembly that includes a drive system and that consists of linked parts, of 
which at least one is moving, is defined as machinery (D 2006/42/EC). For example 
machine tools, packaging machines, agricultural machinery and conveyor belts are de-
fined as machineries (European Commission 2016). However, there are exceptions to 
machineries being in the scope of the Directive. Among other exceptions, weapons, 
audio and video equipment and seagoing vessels are excluded from the scope. Some of 
these excluded machineries are regulated by other legislations. The Machinery Directive 
regulates topics such as the control systems of machinery, required characteristics of 
guards and protective devices and maintenance. There are supplementary health and 
safety requirements for certain categories of machinery, like foodstuffs machinery, in 
the Directive, too. (D 2006/42/EC)  
Guidance documents to help comply with the Machinery Directive have been published 
with the endorsement of the Machinery Committee Working Group. For instance there 
are Guidance documents for Emergency Stop Devices, Equipment used for lifting per-
sons and, above all, the Guide to application of the Machinery Directive. (European 
Commission 2017a) It has been translated into various languages of the Member States 
(European Commission 2017c). 
The Machinery Directive is so called “New Approach”, which means that in addition to 
the mandatory Machinery Directive, there are voluntary harmonized standards (Europe-
an Commission 2017a). The Machinery Directive only instructs the general guidelines 
for essential health and safety requirements, and harmonized standards offer detailed 
technical specifications for various machineries and topics. In designing a machine by 
complying with the applicable standards, it can be confirmed that the machinery meets 
the requirements of the Directive. (European Union 2011) 
The Machinery Directive imposes a requirement on the conformity of machines. It pre-
sumes that the machinery meets the essential health and safety requirements of the Ma-
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chinery Directive. There is a CE conformity marking in use to prove the conformity and 
to allow a free movement for machines on the EU market. (D 2006/42/EC) The CE 
marking must be added on the machine before it is set on the market. However, it does 
not mean that the EU or another authority has proved the machine to be safe but it is 
affixed by the manufacturer, the importer or the distributor of the machine after their 
own assessment. (European Commission 2017b) In order to affix the CE marking on the 
machine, the machinery must have been designed and constructed according to the re-
quirements of the Directive, a conformity assessment must have been executed and 
documented, and a technical file for the machinery must have been compiled. With 
some particular machines there are different procedures on how to prove the conformity 
of the machines in the Directive. It is not allowed to affix CE marking to those products 
which are not regulated by the legislation related to CE marking. Figure 2 shows the 
form for the initials that the CE marking must always consists of. (D 2006/42/EC) 
Figure 2. The Form for the CE Conformity Marking Initials (D 2006/42/EC) 
The Machinery Directive regulates not only the design of the machinery but also the 
design of the safety of all other life cycle phases of the machinery. Once they are 
planned to comply with the essential health and safety requirements, it can decrease the 
amount of risks, accidents and costs that are caused by the accidents related to machin-
ery. The installation and maintenance, too, have a role in machine safety. It is important 
to guarantee that the installation is made appropriately and that the maintenance of the 
machinery is designed to be safe. (D 2006/42/EC) The Directive regulates that after a 
commissioning of a machine, the employer is responsible of ensuring that the conformi-
ty and the safety level of the machine remain adequate through the life cycle of the ma-
chine. Improving actions for the machinery might be necessary if technical solutions are 
not adequate enough for safe work anymore, for example, a decade after the commis-
sioning of the machine. If an employer connects a machine to an assembly of machines, 
the employer is responsible of the safety of the whole assembly and its conformity with 
the essential health and safety requirements of the Directive. (European Commission 
2010) 
In addition to the Machinery Directive, there are other directives of the European Union 
providing requirements for the use of machines in work places in terms of the occupa-
tional safety of workers in work places. The European Union has provided a Council 
Directive on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and 
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health of workers at work (89/391/EEC). It is also called a European Framework Di-
rective on Safety and Health at Work, OSH Framework Directive for short, in which 
“OSH” stands for “occupational safety and health” (EU-OSHA 2017). It emphasizes 
preventative actions and provides a general framework about minimum requirements for 
workplaces to ensure the health and safety of workers and to improve working envi-
ronments (D 89/391/EEC). Based on the Framework Directive more than 25 other indi-
vidual directives have been established for various fields (Kraatz 2016). One of them is 
a Council Directive regarding the minimum safety and health requirements for the 
workplace (89/654/EEC) and it provides more details for workplaces than the Frame-
work Directive. The directive regarding the minimum safety and health requirements for 
the use of work equipment by workers at work (2009/104/EC), too, is an individual di-
rective providing more requirements focusing on the work equipment, including ma-
chines. All these directives provide requirements that have an effect on the occupational 
safety and, in their own way, on the safety of the machinery aiming to protect workers 
from risks resulting from the use of machines and other work equipment (D 
89/391/EEC; D 89/654/EEC; D 2009/104/EC). Moreover, depending on the type of 
machinery there might be more directives to comply with, such as the Directive 
(2014/35/EU) regulating the electrical equipment designed for use within certain volt-
age limits. 
2.4 Legislation of Safety of Machinery in Finland 
In Finland, the legislation regarding the safety of machinery is mainly divided into two 
sections. Firstly, there is the legislation about designing and manufacturing machinery 
and it regards companies and organs that operate as manufacturers and importers of 
machines (L 26.11.2004/1016; A 12.6.2008/400). Then, there is the legislation concen-
trating on occupational aspects related to the safety of machines and other work equip-
ment for employers who operate the use of machines (L 23.8.2002/738; A 
12.6.2008/403). These legislations consist of laws and decrees, as seen in Figure 3. The 
decrees comply with the applicable European Directives, too. (L 23.8.2002/738; L 
26.11.2004/1016; A 12.6.2008/403; A 12.6.2008/403) As a Member State of the Euro-
pean Union, Finland (European Union 2017b) is under the obligation of complying with 
the EU legislation (European Union 2015). The same standards and guidance are bene-
ficial and practical in any case since they provide guidance and recommendations to 
apply regulations (Työsuojeluhallinto 2009). 
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Figure 3. Machinery Safety Regulations in Finland (Malm & Hämäläinen 2006; 
L 23.8.2002/738; L 26.11.2004/1016; A 12.6.2008/400; A 12.6.2008/403) 
To provide regulations for designing and manufacturing machines, usually new ma-
chines, there are a Law Laki eräiden teknisten laitteiden vaatimustenmukaisuudesta 
(26.11.2004/1016) and a Decree Valtioneuvoston asetus koneiden turvallisuudesta 
(12.6.2008/400). The Decree is enacted by the Law but mainly the legislation in the 
European Union level has impacted the Decree. Regarding the machinery safety legisla-
tion, a Machinery Directive (2006/42/EC) is a directive that the Member States of the 
EU implement into a national legislation of their own. (European Union 2015) In Fin-
land the Machinery Directive is implemented into the Decree (12.6.2008/400). It is a 
government decree on the safety of machinery, so called “Machinery Decree” (Tukes 
2013). 
To provide regulations for occupational health and safety and safe use of machines in 
work places where machines are operated and in use, there are an Act Työturval-
lisuuslaki (23.8.2002/738) and a Decree Valtioneuvoston asetus työvälineiden turvallis-
esta käytöstä ja tarkastamisesta (12.6.2008/403). The Decree is prescribed by the Act 
and the Decree implements, too, the Directive regarding the minimum safety and health 
requirements for the use of work equipment by workers at work (2009/104/EC) of the 
EU legislation. The European Framework Directive on Safety and Health at Work 
(89/391/EEC) is implemented into a Finnish legislation in the Act. Also, other regula-
tions of the EU level have had an impact on the Act; including the Council Directive 
regarding the minimum safety and health requirements for the workplace (89/654/EEC). 
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The objectives of the legislation regarding the designing and manufacturing of machines 
are to ensure that all machines produced comply with the requirements of conformity, 
they are alienable for the market and they do not cause any hazard of accident or harm 
to health. This legislation covers manufacturing new machines, assemblies of machin-
ery and modifying new or old machines or an assembly of machinery so that its purpose 
of use changes. (L 26.11.2004/1016; A 12.6.2008/400) But then, once a machine or an 
assembly of machinery is in use and the employer wants to modernize an old machine 
or an assembly of machinery without changing its purpose of use, the legislation to 
comply with is the legislation concentrating on the occupational safety aspects of ma-
chines. The objectives of this legislation are to guarantee a safe working environment 
and conditions, including machines and work equipment for employees and to prevent 
accidents and harms to health originating from work. Also, the legislation of occupa-
tional safety requires that the employer takes into account the development of technolo-
gy to improve working conditions, including machines. (L 23.8.2002/738; A 
12.6.2008/403) 
Essential health and safety requirements of both legislations can be ensured by applying 
the same standards, guidance and recommendations. In general, the required level of 
safety increases when the level of technology develops. The standards describe what an 
achievable level of safety nowadays is, which prevents the solutions that are not up-to-
date anymore, especially when modernizing machinery or work equipment. (Työsuo-
jeluhallinto 2009) 
More accurately, the Figure 4 illustrates how the safety procedure and documentation to 
comply with should be chosen in cases of a demand for a new machine and of a mod-
ernization of an old machine. When manufacturing a totally new machine or a new ma-
chine by reusing old parts of an existing machine, the safety procedure and documenta-
tion should follow the Machinery Decree (12.6.2008/400). In this case, the CE marking 
is always required. (Malm & Hämäläinen 2006; A 12.6.2008/400) 
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Figure 4. Safety Procedure and Documentation for Machines in Finland (Malm 
& Hämäläinen 2006; A 12.6.2008/400; A 12.6.2008/403) 
Regarding the Figure 4 and the modernization of an old machine, “old” means that the 
machine or an assembly of machinery has already been commissioned before its mod-
ernization. When modernizing an old machine or an assembly of machinery, the safety 
procedure and documentation to comply with will be chosen according to the occasion 
of commissioning of the machine. If the occasion has been before the year 1995, there 
will be no CE marking on the machine after the modernization. Machines commis-
sioned after 1.1.1995 should already have a CE marking so the old CE marking remains, 
too, after the modernization. Regardless, the safety procedure and documentation needs 
to follow the Decree (12.6.2008/403), which provides requirements on safe use and in-
spection of work equipment. The Decree (12.6.2008/403) does not provide any re-
quirements regarding the CE marking. (Malm & Hämäläinen 2006; A 12.6.2008/403) 
The year 1995 is the limit for the occasion of commissioning of the machine because on 
1.1.1995 Finland joined the European Union and was obligated to implement the rules 
and regulations of the EU. The Machinery Directive was implemented and the old legis-
lation was repealed. (European Union 2017b) 
What is common for these Decrees is that they both require that the manufacturer of the 
machine or employer who is operating the machine executes an assessment to reveal 
and manage possible hazards and risks caused by using the machine. With the assess-
ment it is possible to show deficiencies of safety and by improving and performing cor-
rective actions it is possible to reduce the risks related to the machinery. (A 
12.6.2008/400; A 12.6.2008/403) The Machinery Decree demands for “risk assessment” 
(A 12.6.2008/400) and the Government Decree demands for “hazard assessment” (A 
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12.6.2008/403), however, they provide basically the same requirement and the out-
comes of the assessments are similar to each other. 
2.5 On Design of Safety of Machinery 
2.5.1 Harmonized Standards of Safety of Machinery 
The European Union uses different kinds of standards to support its legislation. The 
standards, which are made to apply to the legislation of harmonization and are provided 
by the European standardization organizations CEN, CENELEC or ETSI, are called 
“harmonized standards”. (Suomen Standardisoimisliitto SFS ry 2017a) The European 
standardization organizations are requested by the European Commission to provide 
these standards (European Union 2011). Letters “EN” in the reference of the standard 
show that it is a European standard and it has been confirmed by CEN. Letters “ISO” in 
the reference of the standard means that it has been confirmed by the International Or-
ganization for Standardization (ISO) and it is an international standard. When standards 
are confirmed in Finland, they are marked with letters “SFS”. Standards can be con-
firmed by more than one organization, in which case there is more than one of these 
marks in the reference of the standard. (Suomen Standardisoimisliitto SFS ry 2017b) 
Harmonized standards regarding the safety of machinery are based on the Machinery 
Directive (2006/42/EC) of the European Union. The Directive provides the general re-
quirements whereas the standards instruct detailed information on technical specifica-
tions on health and safety requirements for machinery. Following the standards is vol-
untary but by manufacturing the machine in conformity with them and using applicable 
standards, the requirements are achievable systematically, and the authorities are liable 
for admitting that the machine fulfills the essential health and safety requirements of the 
Machinery Directive. (European Union 2011) The CE marking is used to prove the con-
formity with those requirements and, once the CE marking is affixed to the machine, it 
means the machine is eligible for a free movement in the EU market (D 2006/42/EC). 
Harmonized standards regarding the safety of machinery are divided into three catego-
ries: type-A, type-B and type-C standards. Type-A standards are basic safety standards, 
which give instructions for basic concepts, general aspects and design principles appli-
cable to the machinery. (SFS-EN ISO 12100:2010) The application of type-A standards 
alone is not enough to ensure a full presumption of conformity (European Commission 
2016). Type-B standards are generic safety standards focusing on specific aspects or 
specific types of safeguards which can be used across a wide range of machineries. 
They are divided into type-B1 and type-B2 standards. Type-B1 standards deal with spe-
cific safety aspects, such as safety distances, and type-B2 deals with specific safeguards, 
such as interlocking devices. (SFS-EN ISO 12100:2010) The application of type-B 
standards alone does not confer a presumption of conformity, except for the safety com-
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ponents which are independently placed on the market, but in relation to type-C stand-
ard or a manufacturer’s risk assessment, type-B standard and its specifications can con-
fer the presumption of conformity (European Commission 2016). Type-C standards are 
machine safety standards which provide detailed safety requirements for a given catego-
ry of machinery (SFS-EN ISO 12100:2010). The application of type-C standards con-
fers a presumption of conformity in relation to a manufacturer’s risk assessment (Euro-
pean Commission 2016). The requirements of type-C standards always take precedence 
to the requirements of type-B standard (Suomen standardisoimisliitto SFS ry 2015). 
The standard EN ISO 12100 Safety of Machinery is a type-A standard that provides 
general principles for design, risk assessment and risk reduction. Risk assessment meth-
odologies confirmed to be suitable for machinery are described in the standard. (SFS-
EN ISO 12100:2010) In addition, the technical report ISO/TR 12141-2 is an informative 
report about the safety of machinery and risk assessment. It is in line with the standard 
EN ISO 12100 and provides practical guidance and examples of the presented methods. 
These are useful standards for all designers and manufacturers of machines. (SFS-
ISO/TR 14121-2:2012) There are hundreds of type-B and type-C standards published. 
The table 1 shows some examples of harmonized standards, their reference numbers and 
names. (European Commission 2016) 
Table 1. List of a Certain Harmonized Standards (European Commission 2016) 
 
Some of the harmonized standards are divided into parts. Standard related to permanent 
means of access to machinery is divided into 4 parts. Part 1 provides help about choice 
of fixed means and general requirements of access, whereas second part handles work-
ing platforms and walkways. Part 3 is for stairs, stepladders and guard-rails and part 4 
handles fixed ladders. (European Commission 2016) Standards provide very detailed 
and technical specifications on the topics (European Union 2011). 
2.5.2 Principles for Risk Assessment of Machinery 
The Machinery Directive (2006/42/EC) requires that a risk assessment has to be carried 
out when designing and manufacturing machinery on the EU market. The process of 
risk assessment related to design of the safety of machinery is introduced in both the 
Machinery Directive and the standard ISO 12100 Safety of Machinery. The process of 
Reference
EN ISO 12100 Safety of machinery – General principles for design
EN 614-1 + A1 Safety of machinery – Ergonomic design principles – Part 1
EN 547-1 + A1 Safety of machinery – Human body measurements – Part 1
EN 1037 + A1 Safety of machinery – Prevention of unexpected start-up
EN ISO 13850 Safety of machinery – Emergency stop function
EN ISO 14119 Safety of machinery – Interlocking devices associated with guards
EN ISO 14120 Safety of machinery – Guards
EN ISO 14122 Safety of machinery – Permanent means of access to machinery – Parts 1–4
Title of the standard
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risk assessment comprises a determination of limits of the machinery, a hazard identifi-
cation, a risk estimation, and a risk evaluation. The risk management includes also the 
risk reduction following this process. (D 2006/42/EC; SFS-EN ISO 12100:2010) 
The determination of limits of machinery is the first step of risk assessment of the ma-
chinery. In order to make a successful risk assessment for the machine, the limits of the 
machinery must be determined. The aim of the determination of limits of machinery is 
to identify and gather all the necessary information about the machine, its characteris-
tics, functions, intended use and environment of use, and also reasonably foreseeable 
misuse. (SFS-ISO/TR 14121-2:2012) The limits consist of different characteristics and 
performances of the machine and the related people, environment and products. The 
limits can be divided into use limits, space limits, time limits, and other limits. Use lim-
its not only include an intended use but also a reasonably foreseeable misuse. Also, the 
different modes of the machines, use of the machine, interventions of the users, 
knowledge and other qualities of the users, and exposure of other people are aspects to 
consider. Space limits mean the range of movement of the machine, the space that users 
need when interacting with the machine during operations and maintenance, operator–
machine interface and machine–power supply interface. Time limits take into account 
the life cycle of the machine and its components, and recommended periods of service. 
Other limits might include properties of the materials to be processed, housekeeping 
including the level of cleanliness required and environment. (SFS-EN ISO 12100:2010) 
The second step of the risk assessment is a systematic hazard identification. An identifi-
cation of hazards and hazardous situations should cover the whole life cycle of the ma-
chine, and every situation including continuously appearing hazards and unexpectedly 
appearing hazards. A task identification is a useful tool to take into account all human 
interaction with the machine. Tasks can be for example setting, start-up, all modes of 
operation, feeding the machine, removal of product from machine, stopping the machine 
intentionally and in case of emergency, recovery of operation from blockage, trouble-
shooting, and preventive and corrective maintenance. After the tasks are identified, all 
reasonably foreseeable hazards related to them shall be identified. Hazards and hazard-
ous situations can also appear in different states of the machine, when the machine func-
tions normally or with unintended functions. Moreover, reasonably foreseeable misuse 
of the machine should be surveyed, since misuse resulting from human performance 
with its cognitive aspects, such as a lack of concentration, fatigue, carelessness, reflex 
behavior in case of a malfunction or incident, could cause hazards. Among other things, 
a misuse can also include actions caused by pressure to keep the machine running or 
loss of control of the machine. (SFS-EN ISO 12100:2010) 
The third step of the risk assessment is the risk estimation. Risks resulting from hazard-
ous situations identified in the second step of the risk assessment need to be estimated. 
(SFS-EN ISO 12100:2010) There are several different methods to estimate risks. A risk 
estimation can be carried out by a qualitative or quantitative assessment. (Aven 2008) 
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The standard ISO 12100 represents a qualitative risk estimation. The technical report 
ISO/TR 14121-2 represents several styles, which are suitable when estimating risks re-
lated to the machinery (SFS-ISO/TR 14121-2:2012). 
When following the standard SFS-EN ISO 12100, there are different elements of risk 
regarding the safety of machinery, as can be seen in the Figure 5. The standard SFS-EN 
ISO 12100 (2010) presents that the risk related to the considered hazard is a combina-
tion of severity of harm that can result from the considered hazard and probability of 
occurrence of that harm, which is a combination of three elements: exposure of persons 
to the hazard, the occurrence of a hazardous event and the possibility to avoid or limit 
the harm.  It is possible to estimate the severity of harm by the severity of injuries and 
the extent of harm. When considering the exposure of persons to the hazard, especially, 
the need of users to access the hazard zone and time spent in there, the nature of the 
access, the amount of persons, and frequency of accesses have an impact on it. The oc-
currence of a hazardous event can originate from a human or technical source, and sta-
tistical data and history about accidents and damages to health help to estimate it. The 
possibility to avoid or limit the harm should be estimated by considering how skilled 
persons exposed to the hazard are, how quickly a hazardous event can escalate into an 
incident, the awareness of risk, and the human ability to avoid or limit harm. (SFS-EN 
ISO 12100:2010) It is essential to notice that one hazard can possibly cause more than 
one risk thus a same hazard might require several estimations (SFS-ISO/TR 14121-
2:2012). 
 
Figure 5. Elements of the Risk (SFS-EN ISO 12100:2010) 
The risk evaluation is the forth step of the risk assessment. The aim of the risk evalua-
tion is to decide which risks need to be reduced. Appropriate protective measures need 
to be chosen to reduce the risk that cannot be accepted. After applying the measures, it 
has to be reviewed that they do not cause any new hazards, or if they do, the risk as-
sessment has to be repeated for them. The risk reduction based on the risk evaluation is 
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adequate enough once all operations, their conditions, tasks and interventions required 
from users have been observed, all hazards and risks have been removed or reduced to 
acceptable level, residual risks are notified to users, and also possibility and conse-
quences of using the machine in non-industrial or other non-designed context have been 
considered. In general, residual risk means the risk that remains after risk reduction has 
been done. Moreover, it has to be observed that the protective measures do not have a 
negative effect on the usability of the machine or the working conditions of the user. 
(SFS-EN ISO 12100:2010) 
Regarding the risk reduction, the principle for the design of the safety of machinery and 
protective measures is a tripartite method required by the Machine Directive and pre-
sented in the standard SFS-EN ISO 12100 Safety of Machinery. The first and most im-
portant step is to eliminate the hazards or reduce the risks by applying inherently safe 
design measures. It means by changing the design of the feature of the machine or 
changing the user–machine interaction. Features of the machine to be taken into account 
are, for instance, physical aspects, choice of appropriate technology, applying principle 
of positive mechanical action, or provisions for stability. Secondly, safeguarding and 
complementary protective measures are used to eliminate or reduce the risks remaining 
in the machine. Safeguarding means guards and safety devices, and protective measures 
are for example emergency stop devices and walkways. Thirdly, the information for use 
about the hazards and risks remaining despite the design and safety measures is provid-
ed either in the instruction handbook of the machine or, primarily, on the machine, in 
form of warning signs, signals, or warning devices. (SFS-EN ISO 12100:2010; Suomen 
Standardisoimisliitto SFS ry 2015) 
The risk assessment should be carried out by a team rather than by one person only. It 
can be more efficient and comprehensive when the team is made up of multiple persons 
and their knowledge affects the results. People attending the risk assessment can vary 
depending on what the risk assessment is like. However, a wide range of knowledge on 
the topic in question should be guaranteed in order to perform a reliable risk assessment. 
Also, the team needs a team leader who takes care of the risk assessment in its entirety. 
(SFS-ISO/TR 14121-2:2012) 
2.5.3 Safeguards and Complementary Protective Measures 
Safeguards and complementary protective measures are the second step of the principle 
for the design of the safety of machinery, aiming at eliminating the hazards and reduc-
ing the risks that remain after the designer has applied the inherently safe design 
measures. Safeguards and complementary protective measures include guards, safety 
devices, safeguards for reducing emissions, and complementary protective measures. 
When choosing a safeguard for a certain machine, the choice has to be based on the risk 
assessment. (SFS-EN ISO 12100:2010) 
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The main functions of guards are to prevent the access of persons to the space or hazard 
zone of the machine, and to prevent the access of different materials, such as workpiec-
es, chips, liquids or emissions, to the outside of the intended space. Protective devices 
are devices connected to the control system of the machine, and the chosen devices 
must meet the requirements of the particular product standard. The design of guards and 
protective devices should be done so that they are not easily defeated. Complementary 
protective measures are used in addition to the inherently safe design measures, safe-
guarding and information for use, and they contain for example components to achieve 
emergency stop function, measures for the escape and rescue of trapped persons, 
measures for isolation and energy dissipation, and measures for safe access to machin-
ery. (SFS-EN ISO 12100:2010) 
Properties and hazards related to safeguards and complementary protective devices 
should be taken into account when designing them for the machinery. Safeguards and 
complementary protective devices should be suitable into the working environment 
where the machinery will be used. The required properties of safeguards and comple-
mentary protective devices include them to be robust enough by their construction and 
to be located far enough from the hazardous zone. Safeguards and protective devices 
should never cause any additional hazard and they should not be bypassed or defeated 
easily. The observation and view for operations of production should not be prevented 
or blocked by safeguards or protective devices. When possible, safeguards and protec-
tive devices should be designed to allow access to the area required by essential tasks of 
maintenance so that there is no need to remove safeguards or protective device and the 
tasks can be performed safely. (SFS-EN ISO 12100:2010) The intended use and fore-
seeable misuse of the machinery are essential information when choosing and designing 
safety measures for the machinery. If the usage of the machine is difficult or if it chang-
es to be more difficult than normally on some occasion, it may entice the operator to 
defeat safeguards or protective equipment to make the machine easier to use, which 
might cause significant hazards. The possibilities for this kind of behavior should be 
eliminated within the design of the machine. (SFS-EN ISO 14120:2015) 
The selection of guards is wide, and characteristics of guards vary. The applicable guard 
is chosen by depending on the need of access to the hazard zone: whether the access is 
needed during normal operations or not, or if the access is needed for machine setting, 
faultfinding, cleaning or maintenance. If there is no need for access to the hazard zone 
of the machine during normal operation, the type of the chosen safeguard should be a 
fixed guard, an interlocking guard with or without guard locking, a self-closing guard, 
or a sensitive protective equipment, for example an electrosensitive protective equip-
ment or pressure-sensitive protective devices. When the guard needs to allow the access 
to the hazard zone regularly during normal operation, the safeguard should be an inter-
locking guard with or without guard locking, a sensitive protective equipment, for ex-
ample an electrosensitive protective equipment, an adjustable guard, a self-closing 
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guard, two-hand control devices, or an interlocking guard with a start function, also 
called a control guard. The design of the machine should take into account, in addition 
to normal operations, the operations such as machine setting, teaching, faultfinding, 
cleaning or maintenance that require access to the hazard zone; the safeguards should 
provide protection for every user operating the machine throughout the life cycle of the 
machine. (SFS-EN ISO 12100:2010) However, every guard has their own problems, so 
choosing safeguards should be carried out cautiously (Backström & Döös 2000).  
Fixed guards are guards that are affixed so permanently that they can be removed or 
opened only by using tools. Suitable ways for affixing are for instance screws, nuts and 
welding. (SFS-EN ISO 12100:2010) The tools for opening fixed guard can be for ex-
ample a key or a wrench. Implements, that are not designed to open and close a fastener, 
are not perceived as a tool, for example coin or nail-file. (SFS-EN ISO 14120:2015) 
Interlocking guards are guards that are connected to an interlocking device and control 
system of a machine. The aim of an interlocking is to prevent the machine from execut-
ing hazardous functions as long as the guard is open, to stop the machine if the guard is 
opened during hazardous functions and to allow the machine to operate hazardous func-
tions when the guard is closed but, however, closing the guard should not start the func-
tions by itself. The interlocking can be implemented with or without guard locking. 
With a guard locking, the interlocking guard has to be not only closed but also locked in 
order to allow performing the hazardous function that it is guarding. Interlocking guards 
with a start function are a special type of interlocking guards. They are also called con-
trol guards. A control guard starts the hazardous function of the machine without using 
any separate start control after the guard is closed. (SFS-EN ISO 12100:2010) 
Self-closing guards are movable guards which allow operated workpiece to pass and 
then they close automatically. The workpiece can also be fastened by a part of the ma-
chining jig and then the machining jig passes the opening of the self-closing guard. The 
returning of the self-closing guard can be carried out by gravity, spring or another ex-
ternal power. (SFS-EN ISO 14120:2015) 
Adjustable guards are guards that are either wholly adjustable or partly adjustable. Part-
ly adjustable guards feature parts of which at least one is adjustable. An adjustable 
guard can be a fixed or a movable guard. (SFS-EN ISO 12100:2010) The adjustment 
can also be made manually. In this case, the adjustment stays fixed while the machine is 
performing certain operations. (SFS-EN ISO 14120:2015) 
A sensitive protective equipment (SPE) is an equipment to detect a person or a body 
part of person within the certain area and to send a signal to the control system of the 
machinery. Usually the signal starts the wanted function. The aim is to reduce the pos-
sible risk that threatens the person who entered the area. The tripping of the signal can 
be caused by crossing a certain limit or by a presence sensing in a certain area. Exam-
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ples of a SPE are an electrosensitive and pressure-sensitive protective equipment. When 
there is no need to access the hazard zone during normal operations, pressure-sensitive 
protective devices are suitable for guarding the hazard zone. (SFS-EN ISO 12100:2010) 
Two-hand control devices are control devices that require the user to actuate with both 
hands simultaneously. Actuating with two hands allows the machine to perform the 
hazardous function that is otherwise non-functional. The protective measure that a two-
hand control device provides is directed only at the person who is actuating the control 
device. (SFS-EN ISO 12100:2010) 
Multiple standards can be helpful when designing safeguards and complementary pro-
tective devices. For instance, standards ISO 13855 and ISO 13857 provide information 
related to the positioning of safeguards. ISO 13855 advises “positioning of safeguards 
with respect to the approach speeds of parts of the human body”. ISO 13857 advises 
“safety distances to prevent hazard zone being reached by upper and lower limbs”. 
Standards ISO 14119 and ISO 14120 provide information related to guards. ISO 14119 
advises “interlocking devices associated with guards, principles for design and selec-
tion”. ISO 14120 advises “general requirements for the design and construction of fixed 
and movable guards”. Also, once a machine includes built-in platforms or stairs, they 
have to be designed acknowledging safeguards and protective devices. Such infor-
mation is provided by the standard ISO 14122 for permanent means of access to the 
machinery. (European Commission 2016) 
2.5.4 Information For Use 
The information for use is the third and final step of principle for the design of the safe-
ty of machinery. After the designer has applied the inherently safe design measures and 
eliminated hazards and reduced risks by designing safeguards and complementary pro-
tective devices, the residual risks remaining within the machine are made clear to the 
user of the machine with the information for use. The information for use is affixed to 
the machine or written in the instruction handbook of the machine. It can also be pro-
vided both ways. The information affixed to the machine can consist, for instance, of 
warning signs, warning signals or warning devices. In the instruction handbook there 
might be, for example, texts, symbols or charts. (SFS-EN ISO 12100:2010) 
The designer of the machine needs to provide the information for use in order to reduce 
the risks remaining within the machine. However, these provided protective measures 
have to be taken under the control of the user, so that they become effective. The infor-
mation for use is aimed at each user of the machine, no matter if the user is a profes-
sional or a non-professional. Hence, the information for use has to be easily understand-
able and to cover all possible and intended operation modes. The information for use 
should provide all the instructions required to use the machine safely and to provide 
information about the residual risks of the machine, so that the user is aware of them 
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and knows how to avoid them. When necessary, the information for use should provide 
requirements concerning the training of the user, the use of personal protective equip-
ment and possible additional safeguards. Also, the information for use should cover all 
hazards and associated risks which could occur during the life cycle of the machine, 
including assembling, installation, commissioning of the machine, among other things. 
(SFS-EN ISO 12100:2010) 
The positioning of the information for use depends on the risk, the time when it is need-
ed and the physical structure of the machine. Visual and audible signals within the ma-
chine, such as flashing lights and sirens, are useful ways to warn of hazardous events. 
They need to be executed before the hazardous event happens. Also, the signals need to 
be unequivocal so that they are easily noticed and not mixed up with other used signals. 
(SFS-EN ISO 12100:2010) 
There has to be markings on the machine providing some information at least about the 
series or type of the machine, its manufacturer, markings to prove that the machine 
complies with the mandatory requirements and all the necessary information so that the 
machine can be used safely. Such information might be, among other things, the maxi-
mum speed of rotating parts, the mass of the machine, the maximum working load or 
the need to wear personal protective equipment. Of course, the permanent markings 
affixed to the machine should always be readable during the whole life cycle of the ma-
chine. Other ways to add the information for use on the machine include signs, picto-
grams, symbols and written warnings. The culture where the machine is to be used af-
fects the markings that can be affixed to the machine; symbols and pictograms in signs 
are essential to be easily understandable. (SFS-EN ISO 12100:2010) 
The written instructions given on the machine or the instruction handbook of the ma-
chine include detailed information on the machine. Such information should cover for 
example the instructions for handling the machine, how to store and install the machine, 
the information on the machine itself, its use and maintenance, and instructions in case 
of emergency situations associated with the machine. The operator should know appli-
cable operating methods if an accident or a breakdown occur. (SFS-EN ISO 
12100:2010) 
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3. OBJECT AND EXECUTION OF THE RE-
SEARCH 
3.1 Ahlstrom-Munksjö and Object of the Research 
Ahlstrom-Munksjö is a public company that provides fiber-based materials globally for 
industrial applications and end user products. Ahlstrom-Munksjö was formed on April 
1
st
, 2017 when Ahlstrom Corporation and Munksjö Oyj merged. After the merger the 
net sales of the company increased to about 2.15 billion euros. The company has 6,000 
employees. Spread over 14 countries Ahlstrom-Munksjö has 41 sites for production and 
converting. The share of Ahlstrom-Munksjö is listed on the Nasdaq Helsinki and Stock-
holm. (Ahlstrom-Munksjö 2017) 
Ahlstrom-Munksjö has 4 business areas which are Decor, Filtration and Performance, 
Industrial Solutions and Specialties. The business areas provide products such as 
nonwovens, electrotechnical paper, glass fiber materials, tapes, food packaging and la-
beling and medical fiber materials. The main customer segments of Ahlstrom-Munksjö 
are for instance the automotive, energy, printing, medical and diagnostics industries. In 
2016, 60 percent of the company’s net sales came from Europe, 24 percent from the 
Americas and 16 percent from the Asia-Pacific region. (Ahlstrom-Munksjö 2017) 
This thesis inspects the production machine in Ahlstrom-Munksjö Tampere Oy, which 
is part of the business area of the Filtration and Performance. The machine originates 
from about 4 decades ago. Naturally, many parts of the machine have been updated 
through the years; still, the purpose of its use has not changed. Since the machine has 
been commissioned before the year 1995, the legislation does not require CE marking 
for it but to comply with the legislation providing requirements regarding occupational 
safety aspects and use of machines (A 12.6.2008/400; A 12.6.2008/403). 
The analyzed machine is a machine producing nonwovens with a wet-laid technique. 
The study was limited to a particular area of the machine, which starts at the end of a 
forming fabric and continues until the end of a conveyor wire after the first drying sec-
tion. The other parts of the machine in this area are a pick-up felt, a dryer and an under 
wire. The analyzed area is comparable to a paper making machine. Other areas of the 
machine were left out of the study due to prioritizing this area. A schematic diagram of 
the machine is shown in Figure 6.  
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Figure 6. Schematic Diagram of the Analyzed Area of the Machine 
The Figure 6 is an approximate sketch of the analyzed area of the machine. It does not 
include all parts of the machine. However, it reflects what kind of machine is in ques-
tion. There are moving parts consisting of several rollers and wires in the analyzed area. 
3.2 Execution of the Research 
This thesis provides information regarding the safety modernization of the machine. 
This thesis featured applied research by its nature and its objectives were (1) to identify 
the safety requirements, regarding the modernization of the chosen area of the machine, 
especially concentrating on safeguards, (2) to identify deficiencies and hazards related 
to the safety of this area of the machine and (3) to propose solutions to meet these re-
quirements and reduce the risks related to the hazards. The mixed research strategy to 
achieve these objectives combines a constructive approach and a risk assessment meth-
od presented by the standard ISO 12100 Safety of Machinery. The method was supple-
mented with a matrix of risk estimation presented by the technical report ISO/TR 
14121-2 Safety of Machinery, and due to the matrix, the definition of risk and its ele-
ments was sharpened. The aspects of the constructive approach were that the need for 
the research originated from the reality and a new reality was constructed with the solu-
tions that were invented and developed, not only found (Lukka 2001). The constructive 
research is featured in the field of the applied research (Järvinen & Järvinen 2011, 103). 
The results of this thesis were used as a basis for the safety modernization of the ma-
chine to improve its safety and the safety of the working environment. 
The risk assessment method based on the standard ISO 12100 was selected for this 
study since it was purpose-built and valid for the machine, even though the possibilities 
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to improve the safety of an already built and existing machine are limited. Inherently 
safe design measures can only be applied efficiently during the designing phase of the 
machine; after that, the focus to improve the safety and eliminate the risks associated 
with the machine is put on safeguarding and complementary protective measures (SFS-
EN ISO 12100:2010). That is why the study concentrated on the safeguarding of the 
machine. The matrix of risk estimation presented by the technical report ISO/TR 14121-
2 was included to further supplement the risk estimation. The research was executed by 
the phases presented in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. The Phases of the Research 
First, statutory safety requirements were identified and it was noted if they were met. 
Secondly, the limits of the machinery were determined, including the tasks performed 
within the machine. The limits of the machinery are an essential base for the later phas-
es of the research. Then a hazard identification was carried out to identify deficiencies 
and hazards related to the safety of this area of the machine, and a risk estimation was 
conducted for identified potential consequences or harms. In the phase of the risk reduc-
tion, corrective actions were considered and solutions were proposed to meet the re-
quirements, reduce the hazards and achieve an acceptable level of safety. The last phase 
of the research was a verification and a validation of the proposed solutions. Each phase 
is described in more details in the following chapters. 
The proposed solutions consisted of information and actions to modernize the safety of 
the machine and what should be taken into account when designing modernization and 
improving safeguards. The plan and modernization of the machine were about to be 
conducted in the near future after the thesis was ready, however, the implementation 
and commissioning of the plan were not in the scope of this thesis. The commissioning 
was not available within the time limits set for this thesis. 
3.3 Identifying the Statutory Safety Requirements 
The analyzed machine is an assembly of machines as defined in the Machinery Decree 
(12.6.2008/400). However, since the machine has been commissioned before the year 
•Identifying the statutory safety requirements 
  
•Determination of limits of machinery  
  
•Hazard identification and risk estimation 
•Risk reduction and solutions 
•Verification and validation 
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1995 in Finland, and its purpose of use has not changed after its commissioning, it does 
not belong to the scope of the Machinery Decree (Malm & Hämäläinen 2006; A 
12.6.2008/400; A 12.6.2008/403). This study answers the need for improving the ma-
chine, hence, what is in question is a modernization of the machine. Then, the statutory 
safety requirements for the modernization are provided by the Government Decree 
(12.6.2008/403), which regulates safe use and inspection of work equipment. The ma-
chine is “work equipment” as defined in the Government Decree (12.6.2008/403). 
Statutory safety requirements of the Government Decree (12.6.2008/403) on the safe 
use and inspection of work equipment were identified and gathered into a table from the 
Decree by paragraphs. At the table, it was mentioned whether the requirements are fully 
or partly complied with or not. For the closer inspection of unfulfilled requirements, 
there were reference comments for risk assessment where the subject is handled more. 
Mostly requirements in one subsection of the Decree are closely combined with each 
other; therefore, they were placed together as one requirement at the table. The determi-
nation of requirements was executed by way of a discussion with the process manager, 
the maintenance specialist and the safety manager. They had required knowledge and 
competence to assess statutory safety requirements regarding the machine and work 
place. 
Only applicable requirements for the analyzed area of the machine were taken into ac-
count. Mostly, they were under the chapter 1 General provisions. Section 1 provided the 
scope of application for the Decree and there were no clear requirements in that section. 
Sections 2–12 regulated applicable topics such as instructions for use of work equip-
ment, assessment and elimination of risks, ensuring the functional condition of work 
equipment. Section 13 regulated hazards originating from weather conditions, and since 
the machine was located inside of a building, this section was not applicable. Section 14 
regulated special competence requirements, of which only the requirement for “drivers 
of devices for lifting persons” was applicable and taken into account. Chapters 2, 3, and 
5 regulated supplementary provisions on mobile work equipment, supplementary provi-
sions applicable to lifting machinery, and “initial and periodic inspections, and a condi-
tion monitoring system”, and they were not applicable. In chapter 4, which provided 
safety requirements for work at height, applicable sections were section 26 regulating 
guard structures and equipment preventing falls and section 30 regulating use and plac-
ing of ladders. Other parts of the chapter 4 concentrated on scaffolding and working the 
help of rope access, and they were not applicable. 
3.4 Determination of Limits of Machinery 
The uses of the machinery regarding the limits of the machinery were determined main-
ly with the task based approach. The task identification was carried out to identify all 
tasks performed by the operators of the machine and the maintenance personnel within 
the analyzed area of the machine. The task identification determines use limits: both 
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intended use and foreseeable misuse. The main sources of the task identification were 
an open questionnaire for operators and maintenance personnel, a Job Safety Analyses 
(JSA) that have been made for this area of the machine, and inquisitive discussions with 
the operators and maintenance personnel in question. Some information was supple-
mented from the lists of orientation for new personnel. 
The form used for the open questionnaire of task identification is in Appendix A (in 
Finnish), and its main function was to gather, as specifically as possible, the tasks per-
formed within the machine. Also, it included columns to ask how often a certain task is 
carried out, if there is any particular needs for the task, for example the need for work 
equipment, space, light, or visibility, and whether the task is performed while the ma-
chine is ON or OFF. The production manager, backup crew and all 5 shifts of operators 
took part in the open questionnaire but the quality controllers were excluded, since they 
do not have the experience of the analyzed area of the machine. Answering the ques-
tionnaires for operators was organized in group sessions with time to discuss together 
but also each operator had the opportunity to answer it as an individual. Each shift an-
swered the questionnaire within its own group. Absent operators answered the ques-
tionnaire later individually. The first time the operators saw the questionnaires hap-
pened outside of normal working hours, so that they were able to concentrate on it bet-
ter than during the work shift. In addition to that, they had the possibility to supplement 
their answers during the next work shifts. The maintenance personnel who answered the 
questionnaire included the maintenance specialist, the internal maintenance personnel 
and the most regular external workers. Due to the nature of the maintenance work, the 
maintenance personnel answered the questionnaire individually. They had time to sup-
plement the answers later during the next work shifts. 
The inquisitive discussions were carried out informally during the work shifts while the 
operators and maintenance personnel were performing their tasks. The main function of 
the discussions was to supplement and define further the task identification. To ease the 
operators in summoning up all possible tasks, certain questions were used. Such ques-
tions asked about tasks within normal and abnormal conditions, observing situations, 
maintenance and most commonly maintained places, places for cleaning and fault-
finding. The operators and maintenance personnel were encouraged to think about how 
they would improve the analyzed area of the machine in order for it to be safer and easi-
er to work with. Additionally, some requirements were drawn onto photography images 
of specific places that had requirements for visibility inside the machine and an access 
or space requirement. This made the limits of the machine more concrete and explicit 
than words. The operators of every shift and maintenance personnel were able to add 
their point of view by drawing different areas onto the image. 
Tail threading is a specific task that operators perform during every start-up and product 
change, and the number and frequency of tail threading are essential information on use 
limits and time limits. The number of tail threading was determined by the number of 
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web breakages. The number and frequency of web breakages were gathered from the 
devices connected to the Enterprise Resources Planning (ERP) system. Web breakages 
include every stop caused by different reasons, for example product changes, planned 
cleaning and maintenance, and unplanned malfunctions. The information was deter-
mined from the latest three years 2014–2016. The frequency was estimated as an aver-
age value: the average in a month and in a day. 
The space limits of the machine were asked in the same open questionnaire that was 
carried out for the operators and maintenance personnel about the task identification. 
The space limits were supplemented by observation and inquisitive discussions while 
operators and maintenance personnel were performing their work tasks. For instance, 
one particular task, which sets limits for the space needed around the machine, is tail 
threading. The aim of the observation was to systematically identify the required space 
limits. Also, the ergonomics of working positions were observed and if there are any 
requirements for the tasks due to ergonomics. The observation was executed by stand-
ing by and monitoring the performance of the tasks. The inquisitive discussions were 
carried out after the observed task, so that the performance of the task was not influ-
enced by the observation or the discussions. The questions asked during the discussions 
were generally related to the opinions of the operators and information about the tasks. 
The observation and discussions were executed with every shift of operators. 
Mostly the information and knowledge regarding the operating environment and other 
limits were gathered and accumulated during the observation, the inquisitive discussions 
and unofficial talks. These were carried out with the operators, maintenance personnel 
and other people, such as managers and specialists. The operating environment and oth-
er limits were for instance information about driving speed of the machine and possible 
impacts of different products. 
3.5 Hazard Identification and Risk Estimation  
There are hazards and hazardous situations or events associated with the tasks per-
formed within the machine. The hazard identification was made based on the task iden-
tification that was carried out within the determination of limits of machinery. For each 
task, all different possible hazards involved were identified. The origin of the hazard 
and the hazardous situation or event, which occur when a person exposes to the hazard, 
were first to be identified. Secondly, potential consequences or harm related to the haz-
ardous situation or events were assessed. Moreover, hazards were identified with the 
checklists provided by the standard ISO 12100 Safety of machinery. The checklists in-
cluded different types of hazards that might appear within the machinery. 
During the first subpart of this study, statutory safety requirements of the Government 
Decree (12.6.2008/403) were identified. Unfulfilled and partly fulfilled requirements 
were reviewed during the hazard identification: equivalent requirements were picked up 
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from the Machinery Decree (12.6.2008/400) and the kind of hazards which are related 
to these were reviewed as well. The Machinery Decree provides more specific infor-
mation for the same requirements than the Government Decree and that way it is possi-
ble to assess the requirements in a wider range than with the requirements of the Gov-
ernment Decree. Unfortunately, there was no English translation of the Machinery De-
cree available, therefore, to avoid mistakes caused by an unprofessional translation, the 
requirements were cited literally. This means they are cited in Finnish. Some of these 
requirements already came up within identified tasks and hazards related to them, so 
they were not recorded twice. 
Before the hazard identification, it was decided that some assumptions would be taken 
into account, as assumptions can be an input for a risk assessment (Aven 2008). It was 
decided that only the “worst case scenario” of potential consequences was to be record-
ed and assessed. Often, the most likely consequence or harm was not as serious as “the 
worst case scenario” but risks were intended to assess in a way that really shows haz-
ardous events. The company decided that the assumptions for the hazard identification 
were that there are no unexpected people in the production facilities other than its own 
personnel, including external workers, and guided visitors, and that the personnel uses 
the mandatory personal protective equipment (PPE) and follows the given instructions. 
Also, the fulfilled statutory safety requirements were noticed as assumptions for the risk 
assessment. However, the behavior against the basic instruction was partly included in 
the foreseeable misuse that was reported and assessed regarding the applicable tasks. 
Also, it was assumed that the requirements of statutory safety requirements, such as 
technical requirements, were as assessed earlier. 
A method to gather the information about hazards involved in the identified tasks was 
observation. The operators were observed while they were performing their tasks. The 
aim of the observation was to systematically acknowledge the possible hazards and sit-
uations and events related to them. The observation was executed by standing by and 
monitoring the performance of the tasks. With the checklists, the hazard identification 
was supplemented by inquisitive discussions with the operators. The discussions were 
carried out after the observed task, so that the performance of the task was not influ-
enced by the observation or the discussions. The questions asked during the discussions 
were connected to the observation of the operators and information about the tasks and 
known hazards. The observation and the discussions were executed with every shift of 
the operators. 
A risk estimation was carried out for each potential consequences or harm that were 
identified within the hazard identification. The risk estimation started with a discussion 
about the identified hazard, whether all possible hazards were identified or were there 
more hazards within the analyzed area of the machine. The aim of the risk estimation 
was to classify the risks related to the hazards in order to determine which ones have to 
be minimized and reduced. The risk estimation was performed as a work group. At-
30 
tendees of the group were the safety manager, the production manager, the process 
manager, the maintenance specialist, the machine tender and two other operators. The 
attendees were chosen so that the group consisted of employees from multiple grades. 
Gathering such a group aimed to achieve a team with a diverse range of skills and expe-
rience of the machine and tasks performed within the machine. Both the operational and 
the maintenance party were represented. The team consisted of 3 individuals who were 
qualified to tend the machine: the actual machine tender, the other one of the two opera-
tors was a member of the backup crew and thus qualified as machine tender, as well as 
the production manager. The risk estimation meeting was to last 3 hours. The risk esti-
mation was led by the safety trainee who also acted as a secretary of the meeting. 
Regarding the risk estimation, the risk assessment method presented by the standard 
ISO 12100 was supplemented with a matrix of risk estimation presented by the tech-
nical report ISO/TR 14121-2 Safety of machinery. The company had used this matrix of 
risk estimation in the earlier risk assessments and safety audits. It was natural to choose 
it for this study too due to the earlier practices. The matrix provides a slightly different 
definition for the risk and its elements from the standard ISO 12100, so they were 
changed and sharpened to be almost the same definitions as in the matrix.  
The risk estimation was executed with the risk matrix (Figure 8), which has four ele-
ments to form the risk. One aspect, the probability of occurrence of harm is marked as a 
“Class” in Figure 8. It is composed of three of the elements, which are frequency and 
duration of exposure of persons to the hazard, probability of occurrence of a hazardous 
event and possibility of avoiding or limiting harm. The values of these three elements 
were added up to form the value for “Class”. The fourth element is severity of harm. 
 
Figure 8. Risk Estimation Matrix (SFS-ISO/TR 14121-2:2012) 
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Frequency and duration of exposure of persons to the hazard was rated on a scale of 2 to 
5, where the lowest value 2 means “happens less frequently than once a year” and the 
highest value 5 means “happens once an hour or more frequently”. The probability of 
occurrence of a hazardous event was rated on a scale of 1 to 5, where the lowest value 1 
means negligible probability and the highest value 5 means very high probability. The 
possibility of avoiding or limiting harm was rated by the values 1 “likely”, 3 “possible” 
or 5 “impossible”. The severity of harm was rated on a scale of 1 to 4, where values 1 
and 2 represent harm or consequences that are reversible injuries and values 3 and 4 
harm or consequences that are permanent injuries. 
On the risk matrix (Figure 8), where the severity and the probability of occurrence of 
harm, “Class”, cross, the risk estimation gives classification for the harms identified. 
The estimated risks can have three values: white, grey or black, as can be seen in the 
risk matrix. White risk means that it is a low and acceptable risk. The color grey stands 
for a medium risk, which means that safety measures are recommended. Corresponding-
ly, the color black represents a high risk and in that case safety measures are required. 
Figure 9 shows instructions on estimating risk elements within the table, which gathers 
together the results of earlier parts of the risk assessment. There are columns for “task”, 
“origin of hazard”, “hazardous event” and “potential consequences, harm”. These col-
umns are essential for the risk estimation: the values for the elements of risk are selected 
due to information provided in these columns. The task in question defines how often 
the frequency and duration of exposure can happen. Some of the tasks are divided into 
phases. When valuing the frequency and duration of exposure, checking the column of 
the origin of hazard is also needed. How often some hazard occurs within the task varies 
and one task might include more than one hazard. In addition to that, one phase of the 
task might include more than one hazard. The identified hazard can cause a hazardous 
event, which is written in the next column. The probability of occurrence of a hazardous 
event is assessed with the information of this column. A column of “potential conse-
quences, harm” provides information on what kind of harm can potentially occur, and it 
is used when assessing the severity of harm and the possibility of avoiding or limiting 
harm. 
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Figure 9. Instructions on Estimating Risk Elements 
Some of the hazards and risks were identified and estimated in the earlier risk assess-
ments and safety audits outside this study. Applicable hazards and risk estimations of 
these earlier assessments were filled in the risk assessment table before the group work 
event. Added hazards and risks were discussed if they still occur within the same di-
mensions and risks nowadays. 
3.6 Risk Reduction and Solutions 
A risk reduction was carried out for the estimated risks. The aim of the risk reduction 
was to consider and find solutions to minimize and reduce the risks that are not on an 
acceptable level. The risk reduction and finding solutions were carried out for the risks 
that were estimated as “safety measures are recommended” and “safety measures are 
required”. Also, acceptable risks were reviewed in order to see if there would be any 
easy solutions to reduce the risks, for instance including them within the solutions for 
other risks. Figure 10 visualizes which parts of the risk assessment table are essential for 
risk reduction and solutions. While planning the risk reduction, the hazardous event, the 
potential consequences and harm, the requirements of the task and the risk have to be 
taken into account. The proposed solutions and actions required were written down last-
ly.  
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Figure 10. Instructions on Risk Reduction and Solutions 
Also, solutions were proposed to meet the statutory safety requirements. Then, “literal 
citation” of the Decree and “hazard, hazardous event” were essential for proposing solu-
tions. The solutions and required actions were recorded. 
The risk reduction and proposed solutions were discussed with the machine tenders of 
all shifts and most of the operators. The machine tenders were the most critical opera-
tors to comment on them due to their knowledge. The aim of discussions was to share 
and review the ideas to process them further and to find the most practical solutions. 
After that, risk reduction and proposed solutions were reviewed by a group that consist-
ed of the safety manager, the process manager, the production manager and the plant 
manager. The identified risks and proposed solutions were communicated together and 
action plans were discussed. 
The operators brought up many ideas related to risk reduction already during the hazard 
identification. Typically, when a hazard was identified and discussed, possible correc-
tive solutions were also formed. The ideas were gathered at the risk assessment table. 
Primarily, solutions to eliminate the risks were considered. Secondly and most often, 
safeguards and complementary protective measures were considered and brainstormed 
further. Lastly, if it seemed that there was no solution to lower the risks to the accepta-
ble level with safeguards or other safety measure, the information for use was mapped 
out, too. Despite the safeguards, sometimes the information for use was needed. 
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3.7 Verification and Validation 
The proposed solutions and planned corrective actions that reduce risks were the results 
of the study, which were verified and validated. The planned corrective actions were 
designed by the technical designer and other personnel. The proposed solutions were 
handed over to the technical designer who designed the possible implementation of 
safeguards and other changes for the machine. Some of the proposed actions were not 
applicable or reasonable to be designed by the technical designer but to be executed by 
other personnel, such as the electrical and maintenance personnel. 
The verification and validation were performed qualitatively by way of a discussion 
with a group that consisted of the technical designer, the safety manager, the process 
manager, the production manager, the maintenance specialist and the safety trainee. The 
group was gathered for its professional knowledge, and its members had taken part in 
earlier team work events regarding this study, except the technical designer. The group 
was familiar with the requirements and hazards of the machine. 
The results were verified by comparing and assessing how they cover and fulfill the 
original demands: to eliminate and reduce the risks related to hazards and hazardous 
events. In addition to that, requirements of the tasks were taken into account since they 
effected on proposed actions. Figure 11 visualizes which parts of the risk assessment 
table are essential for the verification.  
 
Figure 11. Instructions on Verification 
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The results were validated by assessing if the proposed actions and planned corrective 
actions were valid solutions in practice to eliminate and reduce the risks related to haz-
ards and hazardous events. Again, the requirements of the tasks were taken into account 
since they affected the proposed actions. Figure 12 represents which parts of the risk 
assessment table are essential for the validation. 
 
Figure 12. Instructions on Validation 
The verification and validation were made for all the tasks that included a high or medi-
um risk and for each task that included some requirements so that the new actions 
would not have any unwanted effect, such as blocking an access to somewhere unneces-
sarily. The results of the verification were marked as “Ok” or “Not ok” in the column of 
verification. The results of the validation were marked correspondingly. 
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4. RESULTS 
4.1 Identifying the Statutory Safety Requirements 
The statutory safety requirements for the modernization of this machine consisted of the 
requirements provided by the Government Decree (12.6.2008/403), which regulates the 
safe use and inspection of work equipment. Applicable safety requirements of the De-
cree are gathered at a table (Appendix B). 74 percent of the requirements were fully 
complied with, and the 26 percent of the requirements left were partly complied with. 
None of the requirements were totally unfulfilled. 
The partly fulfilled requirements were included in the risk assessment where they were 
more closely analyzed within the chosen area of the machine. The identified require-
ments that were partly fulfilled were under the topics such as “choosing work equip-
ment, and its placement”, “instructions for use of work equipment”, “properties of 
guards and safety devices”, “warning devices and markings”, “stopping the work 
equipment, and emergency stop”, “guard structures and equipment preventing falls” and 
“use and placing of ladders”. However, the partly fulfilled requirements were largely 
fulfilled but only a few points of each one were not. For instance, there were sufficient 
amount of emergency stop devices on the tender side of the machine but doubts if the 
emergency stop devices were too widely positioned on the drive side of the machine. 
Among other partly fulfilled requirements, this kind of speculation was pondered in the 
risk assessment. Some of the requirements were noticed by the tasks of operators in the 
risk assessment, too, so they were included into the task based assessment.  
Some requirements were fulfilled but, still, included into the risk assessment. For in-
stance, in normal conditions, the work equipment is safe but then hazards caused by 
failure of some tasks might change the situation. Ensuring the functional condition of 
work equipment was one of these topics that were partly included and covered by the 
risk assessment. 
4.2 Determination of Limits of Machinery 
The results of task identification as a use limit are gathered at a table in the risk assess-
ment (Appendix C). The same table includes both intended use and reasonably foresee-
able misuse. The tasks that were identified composed the base for the risk assessment, 
as they were listed as a commencement for task based risk assessment. Tasks are divid-
ed into two sections: the tasks that are performed while the machine is ON and the ones 
while the machine is OFF. Some of the tasks could be done either way, hence, they are 
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primarily positioned in the category while the machine is ON when there might be more 
hazards involved within the task. The tasks include both tasks performed by the opera-
tors and by the maintenance personnel.  
Almost 50 tasks were identified. 54 % of them were tasks which are performed while 
the machine is ON. The other 46 % were performed while the machine is OFF. The 
most common tasks while the machine is ON were observing and cleaning of various 
targets. The most common tasks while the machine is OFF were cleaning and changing 
parts. Again, the targets of these tasks vary. Most of the identified tasks were performed 
on the tender side of the machine. 
The identified tasks set requirements for the working environment around the machine. 
Space limits, including ergonomics, and other requirements for each identified task 
were analyzed and gathered at a table in the risk assessment as “requirements of the 
task”. Limits were written down: if the task requires access to or visibility of the area or 
something else, for example stairs. The space limits were drawn onto photography im-
ages of the machine. The space limits were required for 50 % of the tasks which are 
performed while the machine is ON. Especially, the task of tail threading set the space 
limits needed around the machine. There was an access to the machine from two sides 
of the machine: the tender and the drive side. Clearly, a more frequent access was need-
ed from the tender side of the machine. The determination of space limits concentrated 
more on the tasks that are performed while the machine is ON because the tasks, that 
can be carried out while the machine is OFF, are more flexible regarding for instance 
safeguarding. The guards can be removed while the machine is OFF since many haz-
ards, for instance hazards of moving or rotating elements, do not exist. 
The identified tasks set requirements for the visibility of the machine. These areas of 
required visibility were drawn onto photography images of the machine. 73 % of the 
identified tasks required a visibility of the machine while it is ON. It means that the ana-
lyzed area of the machine has to be easily on view while performing tasks. Moreover, 
the lightning of the machine arose as an issue within the task identification. More spot-
lights were required on certain areas of the machine while the machine is ON and tasks 
are performed. Of course, proper lightning was required during maintenance work, too, 
and other tasks that are mainly performed while the machine is OFF. 
The other use limit, the number and frequency of web breakages, is gathered in Table 2. 
It represents the number and frequency of web breakages in the latest three years of 
2014–2016. The frequency is shown as an average in a month and average in a day. 
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Table 2. The Number and Frequency of Web Breakages 
The number of web breakage was 851 in 2016. The average of the number of web 
breakage in the latest three years of 2014–2016 was 883, so the number of 2016 is rela-
tively close to the previous years, since it’s only 4 % less than the average. The frequen-
cy of web breakage shows that there are 73.6 web breakages in one month on average. It 
means that there are 2.4 web breakages every day on average. Every time there is a web 
breakage, there is a tail threading, too. In other words, the operators of the machine are 
required to perform the tail threading many times a day, and the access to the machine 
has to be simple and undemanding within the places where the tail threading is per-
formed.  
The users of the machine are mainly 5-shift operators, the backup crew, and mainte-
nance personnel. Every shift has its own machine tender in charge of the operations 
during the shift. The backup crew is qualified as a machine tender. The exposure of oth-
er people to the machine is possible: visitors and other workers walk on the walk way 
past the machine. 
The machine is located indoors; therefore the operational and thermal environment re-
mains the same. The driving speed of the machine is normally A m/min. The tail thread-
ing is performed within speed B m/min. The crawling speed is C m/min.  
Other limits of the machine have an effect on time limits. The machine produces differ-
ent kinds of nonwoven based materials, so the properties of the materials that are pro-
cessed vary. While working the open questionnaire of the task identification, the opera-
tors brought up the information that there are different frequencies of some tasks de-
pending on the different products. Producing different products does not significantly 
change necessary tasks but the recurrence interval of some tasks is quicker. Such tasks 
can be for example checking the cleanliness level and then cleaning when required, and 
tail threading. The properties of the products causing these additional repetitions of 
tasks are usually weight and thickness. 
4.3 Hazard Identification and Risk Estimation  
The results of hazard identification and risk estimation are gathered at the table in the 
risk assessment (Appendix C). The results are connected to the earlier tasks that were 
identified. For each task one or more hazards involved within the performance of the 
Year The number of  
web breakage 
The frequency:  
average in a month 
The frequency:  
average in a day 
2016 851 70.9 2.3 
2015 892 74.3 2.4 
2014 906 75.5 2.5 
average 883 73.6 2.4 
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task were identified. Some tasks included more than one phase so the phases were rec-
orded one by one when applicable. Some of the hazards were already known and re-
duced to an acceptable level. Nonetheless, they were gathered in the same risk assess-
ment file to identify all possible hazardous events or situations related to the analyzed 
area of the machine. 
The statutory safety requirements were included into the hazard identification. 11 topics 
were divided into 16 sections. For example one topic related to 3 different areas, which 
were assessed individually. The 16 sections of the statutory safety requirements were 
assessed if there were hazards related to them. In some cases hazardous events were 
assessed, too, just to make sure that there is note of the issues that caused corrective 
actions. The potential consequences and the risk estimation were not carried out, due to 
the statutory base of these requirements: it does not matter which kind of consequences 
there are, the requirements are mandatory to fulfill. In most cases, there were no identi-
fied hazards related to the requirements. This closer inspection for requirements, that 
were earlier assessed as partly fulfilled, were now noted to be fulfilled with new safe-
guarding, and it was also noted that the requirements just have to be remembered while 
designing guards or other safety measures. Yet, deficiencies were identified when stop-
ping the machine. It is equipped with several emergency stops, however, now possible 
incapability to stop the machine in case of emergency on a certain place was discussed 
and the need for the emergency stop device was identified. 
Around 60 task-based hazards were identified. Hazardous events and potential conse-
quences and harms were assessed for each hazard. The most common origin of hazard 
was mechanical hazards. Working nearby rotating elements, access to rotating elements 
was assessed to be the hazardous event that was most frequently related to the tasks. It 
occurred several times within the tasks performed by operators. The most common po-
tential consequence was assessed to be an injury to the hand. Several foreseeable misuse 
cases were identified. Mostly, they were connected to the situations and action that were 
done when a person is cognitively loaded, such as when a person behaves reflexively or 
is tired during the night shift. 
Some of the tasks were divided into phases to be able to assess them in a very detailed 
way. Regarding one task more than 10 phases within different working areas and posi-
tions were identified. This led to a surprisingly large amount of identified hazards with-
in the task, even though there was basically only one hazard, which remained the same 
during the task. If conclusions were made too straightforwardly due to the amount of 
identified hazards, it would not reflect the reality since the tasks were divided into phas-
es this way just to reveal all limits and requirements of the tasks. 
Figure 13 represents two examples of the tasks, the related hazards and estimated risks 
from the risk assessment table. Both situations are within the same task, task A, and 
within the same phase of the task, phase 2. First, there is the situation in which the task 
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fails when the product sticks to the doctor blade. A mechanical hazard was identified, 
caused by rotating elements. If the operator performing the task uses additional working 
equipment to help the product pass the doctor blade, a hazardous event can occur be-
cause there is an access to the rotating elements and additional working equipment 
might stick to the rotating elements. Potential consequences are assessed to be an injury 
to the hand. On the other hand, the situation might go differently: the second situation is 
assessed as a foreseeable misuse. When the task A fails and the product sticks to the 
doctor blade, a foreseeable misuse can happen. In this case, the hazardous event occurs 
if the operator uses his hand thoughtlessly close to the machine and the hazardous zone, 
which consists of rotating elements. Taking the product by hand is not allowed but a 
reflexive action is possible especially when the operator is cognitively loaded, for in-
stance tired. Again, as a potential consequence, there could be harm in form of an injury 
to the hand. 
 
Figure 13. Examples of the Tasks, the Related Hazards and Estimated Risks 
The risk estimation for these situations is similar for both. The severity of harm was 
assessed to be a reversible injury to the hand, which requires medical attention at its 
worst. It got value 2 in both cases. The frequency and duration of exposure of persons to 
the hazard was the same since every time the task A and its phase 2 fails, the foreseea-
ble misuse can also happen. The frequency and duration of exposure of persons to the 
hazard was assessed with value 2 which means it can happen once a year or more fre-
quently, but not as often as once in 2 weeks. The probability of occurrence of a hazard-
ous event was valued as possible, value 3, in both cases. But, the possibility of avoiding 
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or limiting harm is where these situations vary from each other. In the first scenario, the 
possibility of avoiding or limiting harm was assessed to be likely, value 1. The operator 
performing the task can also choose not to use additional working equipment close to 
the rotating elements of the machine. In the second scenario, the possibility of avoiding 
or limiting harm was assessed to be possible, value 3. In this case, the operator can 
avoid harm but not as easily as in the other situation since he might be acting according 
to his instincts. These latest three elements were added up to form probability of occur-
rence of harm, which is marked as a “Cl” in Figure 13. For the first scenario, the proba-
bility of occurrence of harm was 7 and for the second one it was 9. This value and the 
value of the severity of harm leads to the classification of risk by using the risk estima-
tion table. The risk of the first scenario was a low and acceptable risk. The risk of the 
second scenario was a medium risk, which means that safety measures are recommend-
ed. The risk estimation was carried out in a similar way for the other identified tasks and 
hazards. 
In addition to the operators, the maintenance personnel were performing tasks related to 
the maintenance of the machine. During most of the maintenance tasks in the analyzed 
area of the machine, no hazards were identified. One assumption of the risk assessment 
was that the personnel follows given instructions. This has already reduced some risks 
such as an unexpected starting of the machine by using the Lock Out/Tag Out (LOTO) 
procedure. The maintenance tasks were mainly carried out when the machine is turned 
OFF, hence, the LOTO procedure is always used in these tasks. While access and work-
ing nearby to rotating elements was the most frequently occurring hazardous event 
within the tasks performed by the operators, one of the most often occurring hazardous 
events for maintenance personnel was access to and working nearby sharp edges. Injury 
to the hand and injury to the body were common potential consequences within the 
tasks of the maintenance personnel. Some of the tasks did not include any hazards but 
they were still left in the risk assessment table: they set requirements that have to be 
taken into account when designing safeguards. 
4.4 Risk Reduction and Solutions  
The results of risk reduction and finding solutions are gathered at the table in the risk 
assessment (Appendix C) under the title “Proposed solution/Action required”. The re-
sults are connected to the earlier tasks and hazards that were identified. The risk reduc-
tion was assessed for most of the risks. Only some acceptable risks were left as they 
were without any risk reduction measures or finding other solution. 
The most common proposed solution was guard. It means that as a required action there 
is need to improve existing guards, possibly make them to cover wider area of the ma-
chine and simply add more guards for some places. Some areas of the machine were 
lacking of guards, because they had earlier been estimated to include acceptable risks 
and they had not been assessed to be any priorities of actions. Now, the need for im-
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provements of guards was revealed so clearly, and it is practical to cover those areas of 
acceptable risks too. Guards will deny access to many areas which include rotating ele-
ments. It was decided to remove already existing guards and rebuild them in connection 
with the new guards. This way guards can be made to be more continuous and uniform. 
The guards will, also, eliminate and reduce the risks related to foreseeable misuse. Some 
of the misuse cases were connected to situations when there is an access to the rotating 
elements. Once these areas are covered, the identified potential misuse is not possible 
anymore. 
Both fixed and movable guards were assessed to be needed. Some areas clearly require 
fixed guards but some areas and tasks within these areas benefit from the guard with 
occasional access. In fact, some tasks are not possible to carry out without an access to 
the certain areas of the machine. Especially, operators are performing the task of tail 
threading many times a day, as the determination of limits of machine revealed, and 
some of the areas that are vital for tail threading require a movable guard. In principle, 
good solutions were found for these areas. However, finding solutions was not easy 
because of the multiple requirements of the tasks. The machine was not designed origi-
nally with guards, so adding more guards might complicate performing tasks. Of course, 
some of the tasks are practical to perform slightly differently but the performance of 
some tasks simply is forced to be made differently. There were solutions to ease the 
changes. It takes an effort from the operators and maintenance personnel to adapt to a 
new ways of performing the tasks. Even though, the personnel has been involved in this 
study providing information on their work, all the changes made for the machine has to 
be passed on and communicated to the personnel comprehensively. 
The requirements of the tasks were taken into account when proposing solutions to re-
duce the risks. The requirement of visibility caused the proposed solution of a safeguard 
with visibility. In practice, it means that the guard cannot be made of non-transparent 
material. One solution was that the guard could be made of a network structure, in 
which case the operators and maintenance personnel could see through the holes. Of 
course, a guard with holes might not be sufficient enough to secure the personnel from 
flying objects. However, this machine does not produce any heavy products and it was 
not a foreseeable option that parts of heavy pieces could break off the machine. So, the 
network structure as a material for guards was assessed to be a safe choice. In general, 
the tasks required access, visibility, stairs or proper lightning to the machine. More spe-
cific requirements were identified, too.  
The difference between the requirements of the tasks that are performed when the ma-
chine is ON and the tasks when it is OFF was noticed. While the machine is ON, the 
operators mostly require visibility on the machine. While it is OFF, the access is the 
most required demand. This was expected and is a natural result. The proposed solution 
for removing guards was that they be easily removed with one tool or as little tools as 
possible. For instance, the same size of tool for all the screws in the guards would be an 
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easy solution for operators and maintenance personnel. Moreover, the guards should be 
made of more than one piece. Many small pieces allow for the guards to be removed 
only partly, without removing everything. This makes it practical if some tasks require 
access to a particular area only. Yet, the guards cannot be made from too many pieces: 
removing and affixing them cannot be like “playing a puzzle” every time a task requires 
access behind the guards. It is important to find a suitable balance for the size of the 
guards. 
The ergonomics of the operators and maintenance personnel was one aspect of space 
limits to be taken into account. During the execution of the research, the performances 
of the tasks were assessed to be suitable for each operator and maintenance personnel 
regarding ergonomics. There were some requirements of the task due to the ergonomics, 
such as a need for stairs. Guards will change the situation at least regarding the task of 
removing the guards. New guards would probably be wider and larger pieces than the 
existing ones, hence, moving them has to be designed easy and safe in an ergonomic 
way. Moving them by hands requires that it is possible to hold on to them and carry 
them, and that the weight is appropriate for manual lifting. 
Figure 14 represents the proposed solutions or required actions for the same tasks and 
risks that were already shown in Figure 13. The first situation was when task A and its 
phase 2 fails. The risk was acceptable. However, usage of additional work equipment 
within the task raised discussions which resulted in it needing to be safely handled, and 
certain actions were proposed regarding the safeguards. The other situation was when 
the same phase of the task fails and a foreseeable misuse occurs. The required action 
was identified: access to the hazardous zone should be denied with guards. When dis-
cussing about the risk reduction and finding solutions, it was ensured that there is no 
requirement of the task that needs this kind of access to the area which includes the haz-
ardous zone. 
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Figure 14. Examples of the Proposed Solutions as a Risk Reduction 
Foreseeable problems with guards are cleaning them. Guards made of a network struc-
ture might gather dirt. Fibers and pieces of products will probably cause guards to get 
partially dirty which will block the visibility. Operators would need to clean the guards 
when the machine is not producing. However, this is not a big change from the existing 
situation; cleaning is already a recurrent task for the operators. 
The lightning of the area around the machine might need a reassessment after the guards 
are implemented. The guards might block the general light so that more spotlights are 
required to achieve a sufficient level of illumination. As for the lights and visibility 
through the guards, it would be good if a darker color than the one of the actual machine 
or parts of the machine behind the guards was chosen. This helps to see through and see 
the structures behind clearly. 
9 near miss findings were reported while carrying out the risk assessment. Near miss 
findings was the company’s way of reporting possible ideas for improvements or near 
miss cases that happened. These 9 findings were written down as required actions. They 
were reported soon after their identification so that these findings could be taken into 
action without waiting for the implementation of other results of this study. The find-
ings included notes of malfunctions of some part of the machine, demands for cleaning 
some parts of the machine to make them work more sufficiently, ideas for simplifying 
something, ideas for improving the ergonomics of the personnel operating with the ma-
chine or similar types of findings. 
Regarding the statutory safety requirements, the need for an emergency stop device was 
identified. The proposed solution was to add an emergency stop device to a certain 
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place. As other near miss findings, it was reported so that the action could be taken into 
implementation without waiting for the completion of this study. 
4.5 Verification and Validation 
The results of verification and validation are gathered at the table in the risk assessment 
(Appendix C). The validation of the results was only performed by assessing the solu-
tions in theory. The implementation of the results was excluded from the scope of the 
thesis due to the time limits of the thesis and assessing the solutions in practice was not 
possible. 
Almost all of the verified proposed solutions and planned corrective actions were as-
sessed to cover and fulfill the original demands. Some of the proposed solutions were 
lacking of final decisions of what was to be done to fulfill the requirements, or it was 
not clear if the demands were to be fulfilled. These issues were discussed and handled 
later on by the company. 
All of the proposed solutions and planned corrective actions that were verified to cover 
and fulfill the original demands were, also, assessed to be valid solutions in practice to 
eliminate and reduce the risks related to hazards and hazardous events. Figure 15 repre-
sents that 91 percent of the validated results were assessed to be valid. However, 3 per-
cent of the results were not applicable. These 3 percent were related to statutory safety 
requirements and any of the planned corrective action was not related to these require-
ments. However, if the verified solutions, of which the final decisions had not yet been 
made, would be related to these statutory safety requirements, they have to be taken into 
account. 
 
Figure 15. Validation of the Results 
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Figure 16 represents the verification and validation for the same tasks and risks that 
were already shown in Figures 13 and 14. Although the risk is acceptable in the first 
situation, where phase 2 of the task A was failing, required action was needed regarding 
safeguards. In the Figure 16 it can be seen that the same action regarding safeguards 
was a planned corrective action. Within the verification, it was verified that this action 
fulfilled the demands of the situation. 
 
Figure 16. Examples of the Verification and Validation of the Results 
In the second situation, the foreseeable misuse was occurring during the same phase of 
the same task and the risk was medium. The proposed solutions suggested that the ac-
cess should be denied with guards. To add a guard was also the planned corrective ac-
tion. It was verified to be an applicable solution to eliminate the hazard. Both of these 
actions were assessed to be valid solutions in practice. 
The verification and validation of the results showed that the majority of tasks (91 %) 
were achieved to be safe enough as aimed by implementing the proposed solutions and 
planned corrective actions. The results of the research were for the most part sufficient 
enough to meet the requirements set for proposed solutions and to eliminate or reduce 
risks adequately. A minority of the tasks (6 %) remained with the risks that will be 
managed by the company later on. 
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5. DISCUSSION 
5.1 Analysis of the Results 
The results of this research were used as a basis for safety modernization and they made 
sure that the risks related to the hazards within the chosen area of the machine were as-
sessed systematically. The verification of the results confirmed that the majority of the 
results covered and fulfilled the original demands aiming at eliminating and reducing 
risks related to the hazards of the machine by conducting proposed solutions and 
planned corrective actions for the analyzed area of the machine. The validation of the 
results showed that 91 percent of the results were valid solutions in practice. 6 percent 
of the results that were not valid were proposed solutions lacking of a final decisions 
about what will be made. These issues remained with the risk, if there were any risks 
involved, and the company will decide later on what the solution will be. 
Around 50 tasks were identified and around 60 hazards related to them. For some tasks 
there was more than one hazard related to the performance of the task. The risk reduc-
tion has taken this into account: different hazards within the same task had their own 
risk reduction measures. Dividing tasks into phases turned out to be a good solution 
since it contributed to identifying several hazards during different phases of the task. 
The most common hazardous events related to the machine were working nearby rotat-
ing elements when there was an access to the rotating elements. This is in line with the 
findings other studies have revealed too: movements and moving parts of the machine 
and access to them are common reasons for accidents related to machinery (Chinniah 
2015; Backström & Döös 2000). Potential consequences were most often assessed to be 
an injury to the hand. Sometimes access to moving parts is caused by a lack of safe-
guards or there are problems with them (Chinniah 2015). Also, in this research deficien-
cies with safeguards were identified. The safeguards did not cover all of the rotating 
elements, which enables for hazardous events, and further, possible accidents. As a re-
sult, the most common proposed solution was guard: existing guards need to be im-
proved and extended to cover wider areas of the machine to make it safer. Guards are an 
efficient way to reduce risks related to the hazards of machinery, since they deny access 
to the hazardous zone (SFS-EN ISO 12100:2010). The proposed guards include both 
fixed and movable guards since access to certain areas is required during the operations. 
In addition to guards, there were other proposed solutions to carry out within the ma-
chine, such as to add an emergency stop device in a certain place. Assessing through 
statutory safety requirements whether they were complied with or not revealed certain 
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issues, such as sufficiency of the amount of emergency stop devices. When the pro-
posed guards and other solutions are implemented, risks related to the hazards of the 
machine are reduced and the machine reaches a higher level of occupational safety. 
The results of this research concentrated on guards for the most part. Guards feature 
safeguards and complementary safety measures which should always be the second step 
after applying inherently safe design measures to reduce risks and hazards of the ma-
chinery (SFS-EN ISO 12100:2010). In this case, inherently safe measures were not pos-
sible for an existing machine that is decades old and, hence, guards are a valid solution 
to improve the safety of the machinery. Moreover, safeguards are more efficient than 
applying only information for use that relies on informing the users and warning them 
of the hazards of the machinery (SFS-EN ISO 12100:2010). The proposed solutions of 
this thesis minimized the need for additional information for use. The solutions are sim-
ple enough to lower the risks without residual risks that remain within the solutions, and 
mainly, information for use is not required. This makes working with the machine rela-
tively safe in that sense, since users do not have to keep in mind extra safety instructions 
while performing the tasks within the machine. 
This research was based on the fact that the requirements of operations have to be taken 
into account while planning the safety modernization of the machine. It was important 
to gather all possible tasks related to the machine in order to be able to generate solu-
tions and new guards so that they cover all critical and hazardous areas but allow per-
forming the vital tasks of the operations. Clearly, implementing safety measures should 
not form any new hazards or complicate the ergonomics and usage of the machine. It 
would have been easy to eliminate most of the risks related to the hazards of the ma-
chine by simply adding a fixed wall of guards next to the machine, but, it would have 
not taken into account all variables and requirements of the operations. Some tasks are 
vital for production, hence, these tasks have to be carried out while the machine is ON 
and there has to be a safe way to carry them out. Building unpractical solutions could 
cause misuse and defeating safeguards (Backström & Döös 2000) and this was to be 
prevented by finding a practical solution which would match with the requirements. 
The research was concentrated more on the tasks that are performed while the machine 
is ON than OFF. Thus, more hazards were identified within them. In reality, a wider 
range of hazards might be involved within the tasks that are performed while the ma-
chine is OFF since these tasks include so many ranges of different tasks. Nonetheless, 
the tasks performed while the machine is ON were the tasks that affected most on the 
requirements of safeguarding of the machine. By using other safety procedures, such as 
the LOTO procedure, safe working methods can be guaranteed for the tasks performed 
while the machine is OFF. 
The first objective of the research was to identify safety requirements regarding the 
modernization of the chosen area of the machine, especially concentrating on safe-
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guards. This objective produced the first two phases of the research: identifying statuto-
ry safety requirements and determination of limits of machinery to conduct the basic 
information for a later risk assessment. It was essential to gather detailed information in 
order to be able to carry out a successful project related to the modernization of the ma-
chinery (Malm & Hämäläinen 2006) based on the results of this research. The determi-
nation of limits of machinery included a task identification, and an identification of oth-
er limits such as space and time limits. The statutory safety requirements were identified 
from the applicable legislation in Finland, which in this case was the Government De-
cree (12.6.2008/403), which regulates safe use and inspection of work equipment. The 
partly fulfilled requirements were reviewed in the hazard identification based on the 
equivalent requirements from the Machinery Decree (12.6.2008/400). This enabled that 
requirements were assessed more closely with details since Machinery Decree provides 
more specific information for the same requirements than the Government Decree. 
The second objective of the research was to identify deficiencies and hazards related to 
the safety of the chosen area of the machine. The third phase of the research was the 
hazard identification and risk estimation. The determination of limits of machinery and 
the hazard identification were carried out with a task based approach. If they were de-
termined with the machine based approach instead of the task based, it might have re-
sulted in different values for the hazard identification. Though, fewer hazards might 
have been revealed since not all of the hazardous situations were easily recognizable 
before the users of the machine were performing their work tasks. Moreover, the risk 
assessment method was a forward approach, which means assessing situations from 
hazard to harm. It was an applicable approach to be used since it revealed the hazards 
involved more comprehensively than the opposite approach, the backward approach, in 
which situations would have been assessed from harm to hazard (Aven 2008). Thus, 
these chosen approaches, the task based and forward approaches, were productive for 
this research. 
The risk estimation was carried out by following a matrix of risk estimation provided 
the by technical report ISO/TR 14121-2 Safety of Machinery. It can be questioned if a 
numeral risk evaluation was needed: the other option, the qualitative assessment does 
not take as much time as the used numeral assessment and it might give a sufficiently 
detailed assessment of the issues requiring actions and improvements. The people quali-
fied in assessing risks or experienced in executing risk assessments might be able to 
evaluate risks reliably without a numeral rating. Naturally, it may be easier to assess 
whether the actions taken have decreased the risks adequately, when using the numeral 
risk evaluation. On the other hand, the statutory requirements in Finland demand that 
the occupational conditions and hazards related to them are assessed (L 23.8.2002/738; 
A 12.6.2008/403) and the numeral risk evaluation as a part of the risk assessment cer-
tainly complies with this demand. 
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The third objective of the research was to propose solutions to meet the identified re-
quirements and reduce the risks related to the hazards. This objective produced the forth 
phase of the research, which was the risk reduction and solutions. The last phase of the 
research was the verification and validation of the results. The research method included 
the risk assessment, as earlier studies have shown it to be a valuable tool for the safety 
of machinery (Chinniah 2015; Aven 2008). It led systematically to identifying deficien-
cies and hazards related to the machine and to reduce the risks related to the hazards by 
discussing and deciding the proposed solutions. Also, the risk assessment was a logical 
tool to verify if the results of the risk reduction were valid enough to eliminate the iden-
tified hazards and reduce the risks since all individual results were uniformly gathered 
into the same risk assessment table. 
The objectives of the research can be considered fulfilled; the need for this research was 
to conduct information for the safety modernization of a machine and to propose solu-
tions. The information about the requirements, the safety deficiencies and the solutions 
to meet them was conducted widely. The verification and validation of the results con-
firmed that most of the results were applicable to reduce the risks related to the hazards 
of the chosen area of the machine and valid in practice and, thus, fulfilled the objectives. 
This research only concentrated on one chosen area of the machine. If the machine was 
investigated as a whole, it might have revealed different kinds of issues that now re-
mained unidentified. However, the chosen area was particularly demanding and it was 
chosen in the scope of this thesis which enabled investigating it and risks related to its 
hazards thoroughly. By using the same method for a larger area of the machine, for the 
whole machine or for another machine, it is possible to extend the safety modernization 
and systematic risk assessment. 
After an implementation of the results and the safety modernization, it is recommended 
that the company performs a reassessment of risks related to the machine and its work-
ing environment. The reassessment is a useful way of making sure the risks were really 
reduced in a planned way and any other risks were not created. The used risk assess-
ment table already includes the reserved columns for the reassessment of each task and 
related hazards so executing should be simple. There were some proposed solutions 
lacking of final decisions. Once the decisions are made, the company can verify the de-
cided solutions and, after an implementation, carry out the reassessment for them, too. 
Alternatively, another risk assessment method can be used, such as the Job Safety Anal-
ysis (JSA). Anyway, following the impacts of the implemented safety measures is im-
portant. It is recommended to update work instructions after the safety modernization. 
Moreover, all changes of the working environment and methods should be passed on 
and communicated to the personnel comprehensively. 
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5.2 Qualitative Rigor of the Research 
5.2.1 Credibility 
The credibility of the qualitative research is a similar element to what the internal validi-
ty is in a quantitative research. It is an essential aspect to be assessed in order to esti-
mate the truth-value of the qualitative research. (Thomas & Magilvy 2011) In this re-
search, there were aspects within the execution of the research which demonstrate its 
credibility. 
The users of the analyzed machine played a major role as a source of information for the 
research. An open questionnaire, inquisitive discussions and observation were used for 
gathering the required information from the users. To achieve coherent understanding of 
the gathered information, the results were supplementing each other.  
Open questionnaires were executed for each group of users, in this case meaning for 
each shift. The users had time to discuss together and form answers with a common 
understanding. Except the maintenance personnel who answered the questionnaire indi-
vidually. Later, users had time to supplement their answers. Inquisitive discussions were 
carried out with helping questions and a possibility to discuss and supplement the earlier 
given answers. The users were able to define and correct their answers. Also, the obser-
vation that was executed for the users while they were performing the analyzed tasks 
and later discussions, after the observation, did supplement the gathered information. 
These methods were performed with each user of the machine as was defined within the 
research method.  
The results were gathered together. It was easy due to the likeness of the answers of the 
different shifts. Very similar information regarding the limits of the machinery, tasks, 
requirements and hazards appeared. Lastly, after several phases of the research, the 
most qualified users of each shift, the machine tenders, were asked to ensure the results 
of the gathered information. This member checking added credibility to the research. 
Also, it showed that there was reflexivity in the research method once it responded to 
the actions of the participants: they were able to supplement and correct their answers. 
5.2.2 Transferability 
Transferability represents for the qualitative research the same element that external 
validity is for the quantitative research. It studies the applicability of research findings 
or methods to other contexts. (Thomas & Magilvy 2011) This research was estimated as 
transferable due to its high applicability to other contexts. The research method used in 
this thesis is functional and practical to other industries and machineries where human–
machine interface exists. It means different types of machineries, production facilities 
and production lines globally.  
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However, if this research was conducted again in different cultures, the research may 
not be as easily performed as it was in this original context. It depends on the culture, 
both organizational and national, to what extent it is possible to rely on the answers re-
ceived from the users of the machinery. For example, a high resistance to changes might 
lead users not to speak honestly about their working tasks and other limits of the ma-
chinery. Someone might think that, for a clearer example, the less guards there are the 
less the execution of the tasks is bothered. It is good to be aware of this kind of re-
sistance while using this method for conducting information. Yet, the research method 
includes several ways to gather the information, such as the open questionnaire, obser-
vation and discussions, hence, these different ways can be weighted differently from 
what they were in this research, if it seems necessary in some other cultures and con-
texts. Executing, for instance, more observation instead of a questionnaire might lead to 
more comprehensive results in some occasions. 
5.2.3 Dependability 
The dependability represents the reliability of the qualitative research (Thomas & 
Magilvy 2011). This research achieved partially relative high dependability. The aim of 
this research and the research method were precisely described so that it is possible to 
them to be followed and reproducible. Describing the method included recounting the 
reasons for who was participating in the research, what the methods of gathering infor-
mation were and how the relevant information was gathered together as results. The 
research was divided into small phases to make it easier for other researchers to follow 
in the future. 
Some issues had effects on the dependability of the study. One phase of the research 
was the determination of limits of machinery which was a base for the rest of the study. 
It included task identification, in which information was gathered by way of an open 
questionnaire and inquisitive discussions with the users of the machine. The form of the 
open questionnaire was executed in Finnish due to the language skills of the users, yet, 
the specification of the research method clarifies the main clues of the questionnaire so 
that it can be reproduced. 
But, the form used for the open questionnaire was not formal and professional. Now, as 
an unprofessional form, its strength was that it was easy to confront for the operators 
and maintenance personnel. They might have felt that their answers do not have to be 
“perfect” to be written down. However, the form of the open questionnaire could have 
been formulated in a more professional way. It was not totally neutral; it had leading 
questions that “suggested” answers to the people who were answering the questionnaire. 
For instance, there was a column in which it was asked if any possible tool or other re-
quirement was needed for the task in question, and after that there were leading ques-
tions “such as space, light, visibility”. It is likely that this affected the answers collected 
from the questionnaire since these requirements were the most common requirements 
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identified and answered within the tasks. However, these leading examples were clearly 
the most expected requirements involved in many tasks. It can be questioned if they 
would have come up in these numbers without having the leading questions. On the 
other hand, leading questions might have caused that people answering the question-
naire did not take into account other requirements after they identified these led exam-
ples to be involved within the task. That is one reason why the questionnaire was sup-
plemented with inquisitive discussions: people were ushered to supplement their an-
swers and to rethink also other possible answers. 
Once this research was executed, it would change the working environment for the users 
of the machine. Due to this aspect, it has to be questioned if the users gave the infor-
mation that completely reflects the reality. It is always possible that they were answer-
ing more requirements, such as access needed more often to certain places, than what 
real work requires. However, this was taken into account by executing the research for 
each group of users, for each shift, and reflecting their answers to each other. Of course, 
to achieve more accurate information of some requirements, such as the frequency of 
needed access to the machine, the performance of the tasks could have been recorded on 
tape and analyzed based on that. 
Observation is a practical source of information when it comes to executing the tasks 
and hazards involved within. The observation was carried out every time only during 
the day and evening shifts. The performance of the tasks might vary during the night 
shift due to changes in the cognitive aspects of the users. Therefore, it was attempted to 
take into account the changes in the cognitive aspects by assessing a possible misuse 
caused by them. Also, it was justified that the observation occurred on every shift due to 
variable working methods: some of the users use different work positions and work 
tools might vary, too. For instance, some operators might use high pressure water in-
stead of normal pressure water for cleaning the machine. 
The dependability of the research depends strongly on the dependability of the risk as-
sessment. Several phases of the risk assessment included team work, in which the de-
pendability depends on the knowledge and skills of the participants. Therefore, it is es-
sential to reflect whether the teams had required knowledge and skills concerning the 
investigated machinery. 
The participants of the teams varied a little during the research. The users of the ma-
chine were strongly involved during the information gathering phase, in the hazard 
identification and the risk estimation. After that, they were not involved in the team dis-
cussions, however, the risk reduction measures were discussed with most of them indi-
vidually and informally during their work shifts. The most qualified users, the machine 
tenders, were all participating in the risk reduction phase. Then again, the same individ-
uals of managers’ level were attending within the team work events, except the mainte-
nance specialist who did not attend to the risk reduction meeting. Most of them had a 
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long, comprehensive experience of working with the machine. All of them had years of 
experience with this machine. Both maintenance and operational sides were represented 
even though the maintenance specialist was absent once. Lastly, the results of the re-
search were reviewed and verified with a team that took part in the team work events 
and execution of the research. 
The risk assessment was based on the determined limits of machinery. The users of the 
machinery were providing information related to those limits. They know how the ma-
chine functions, what the situations occurring while performing tasks are and how vari-
able products affect on the usage of the machine. In addition, other employees such as 
managers and specialists were sharing their knowledge of the machine. The combina-
tion of knowledge and skills of all attendees were extensive enough to fulfill the re-
quired qualification for a dependable risk assessment. 
The reproduction of the research by another researcher following the descriptions of 
each phase of the research would very probably result in similar findings to this original 
research. However, as this was a qualitative research, the findings might have some var-
iation in the risk assessment. The estimation of risks always depends on the attendees 
and their qualification and knowledge of the analyzed machinery. 
5.2.4 Confirmability 
The confirmability of the qualitative research is similar to what the objectivity is in the 
quantitative research. It occurs once all the other elements of qualitative rigor have been 
established. (Thomas & Magilvy 2011) The credibility, transferability and dependability 
of this research can be considered as established, and further, confirmability of the re-
search. 
There were some preconceptions while executing the research. It was pondered by the 
writer of the thesis what it would take to make sure that foreseeable misuse does not 
happen. Fortunately, it turned out to be relatively simple to eliminate some identified 
foreseeable misuse cases by guards. With the proposed guards, there is no need to load 
operators with instructions that are rarely applicable. In addition to that, the identified 
risks within the machine were pretty much the similar kinds of issues that were ex-
pected. However, new issues were revealed, too. Gathering together all possible hazards 
was highly practical in order to conduct the results. The unity of the results consisted of 
the knowledge and information of the participants of the research. 
5.3 Scientific Contribution 
This research confirmed the same findings of earlier studies: machinery is likely to in-
clude safety deficiencies, especially connected to guarding hazardous zone and moving 
parts of machinery or machine movements. Hazards can efficiently be reduced with 
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safeguards and modernization, however, in this case, it will not compensate totally the 
lack of inherently safe design measures. This thesis provided one method on how to 
reveal safety deficiencies related to the usage of the machinery and conduct information 
for safety improvements through modernization. This method was used to bring up the 
experience and feedback from the users to the designing of the modernization. Retro-
spectively, it would be useful to study how effective the safety modernization really was 
regarding the safety of the machinery: were the safety of the machinery and its working 
conditions and environment improved and the hazards and risks reduced as verified be-
forehand. 
Further studies could be related to the effectiveness of the safety modernizations of var-
ious types of machineries and how efficient these modernizations can be when com-
pared to machineries, in which inherently safe design measures were applied in the first 
place. Are there any differences between the amounts or severities of accidents in mod-
ernized and non-modernized machines? It would be worth studying what kind of design 
issues especially lead users to defeat safeguarding. Also, it could be reviewed how ex-
periences of users could more easily be brought to the designer of the machine, and how 
the designers of machineries could effectively be qualified to take safety aspects into 
account more accurately when designing machinery. 
5.4 Practical Contribution 
This thesis was carried out to conduct information for a safety modernization of a ma-
chine that is operated by Ahlstrom-Munksjö Tampere Oy. The results of this research 
conducted proposed solutions to eliminate and reduce risks related to the hazards that 
were identified within the chosen area of the machine. The company can implement the 
results and, thanks to them, carry out successfully the safety modernization and improve 
the safety of the machine and its working environment. 
The research revealed safety deficiencies and hazards especially occurring within rotat-
ing parts of the machinery and how these areas can be made safer by improving safe-
guarding, furthermore, mainly with a combination of different types of guards. Earlier 
studies have revealed how important it is to take into account all the aspects that are 
affecting the design of machineries: users might defeat safeguarding if it makes their 
work easier even though it endangers their safety (Backström & Döös 2000). This re-
search pointed out one method to do so. The used method is functional to achieve more 
comprehensive design for the modernization of machinery. 
The research method combined a constructive approach and a risk assessment method 
aiming at finding the problems and corresponding solutions. The method used gathered 
together several issues to compose the proposed solutions, which included the proposed 
guards. The characteristics of the guards and other solutions were composed by infor-
mation of the statutory safety requirements, the limits of the machine, the working envi-
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ronment and different usage of the machine including their multiple requirements, such 
as visibility of and access to the machine, the ergonomics and foreseeable misuse and 
problems. This method proved to be effective in combining several kinds of aspects to 
conduct the requested information, which was now used for the safety modernization of 
a machine. The method can be used to conduct information for various other situations 
when several aspects concerning machinery, its use and environment have to be taken 
into account. 
The company can use the same method conducting information and assessing risks re-
lated to hazards of machineries in all its other locations and plants to harmonize the as-
sessment methods. The method makes sure that the risks within the machinery are as-
sessed systematically. Further follow-ups are recommended to assess how the use of the 
machine has really changed and how the proposed solutions and new actions that arose 
from the risk assessment affected the working methods and working environment. If 
some risks still occur with the machine, information for use, such as work instructions 
and warning signs, should be provided and risks communicated to the users of the ma-
chine. 
The used research method is relatively simple, practical and relevant to other industries 
and machineries where human–machine interface exists. It can be used for different 
types of machineries and production facilities in other locations, factories and indus-
tries. It was used for an existing machinery in this research, yet, this method is also suit-
able for assessing occupational hazards and aspects proactively during the design phase 
of a machinery. But then, other assessments might be required, too. However, if there is 
no human–machine interface within the machinery, this method is not effective. The 
task based approach should be, at least, changed to a machine based approach in order 
to be applicable and effective with, for instance, automated machineries where the hu-
man–machine interface does not exist. Correspondingly, if the method is used to assess 
occupational risks without machines, it needs to be modified to fit for the intended use. 
For example the determination of limits of machinery could be changed to a determina-
tion of other aspects of the working environment. Of course, the task based hazard iden-
tification is valid for all kinds of occupational hazards. The risk estimation used in the 
method might be too complicated for hazards occurring within other than industrial en-
vironment. Then, instead of 4 elements of risk, 2 elements could be sufficient enough. 
 
57 
6. CONCLUSION 
Machinery and usage of machinery cause accidents globally. Accidents have negative 
effects on organizations and societies, not to mention the individual who is injured in 
the accident. At work places, the employer is responsible to ensure that all the operating 
machineries comply with the safety requirement of the legislation. Primarily, machiner-
ies should be designed and produced to be safe during their whole life cycle. Once there 
is a machinery that does not comply with the safety requirements, it can be modernized 
to improve its safety. 
This thesis analyzed the safety of a machine that was operated by Ahlstrom-Munksjö 
Tampere Oy. The machine has been commissioned decades ago and the safety moderni-
zation of the machine was timely again, especially regarding the safety of one particu-
larly difficult area of the machine. The thesis combined together several relevant aspects 
to conduct required information for the safety modernization of the chosen area of the 
machine. 
The research method combined a constructive approach and a risk assessment aiming at 
finding the problems and corresponding solutions. By dividing the research into phases, 
the objectives were achieved systematically. The phases studied through the statutory 
safety requirements, the limits of the machinery, the safety deficiencies and hazards, the 
risks related to the hazards, the risk reduction and finding solutions. Lastly, the results 
were verified and validated. 
After the verification of the results, the validation of the results showed that 91 percent 
of them were valid in corresponding to objectives which aimed at eliminating and re-
ducing the risks related to the hazards of the machine. The results concentrated mainly 
on proposing safeguards, which included both fixed and movable guards. The most 
common hazardous event was assessed to be working nearby and access to rotating el-
ements. Guards deny the access to a hazardous zone of the machine and, hence, reduce 
hazards and risks efficiently. By implementing the results, the company can improve the 
safety of the machine and its working conditions and environment, and it is made sure 
that the risks are assessed systematically. 
This research was limited to only one chosen area of the machine and an investigation 
as a whole machine was not on the scope. Different kinds of hazards might have been 
revealed if the research was extended to a larger area of the machine or to the whole 
machine. After the company executes the safety modernization, a reassessment of risks 
is recommended to estimate whether the proposed solutions were effective enough to 
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reduce the risks in reality. It would be useful to carry out the same risk assessment for 
other machineries, also in different locations and plants of the company, to harmonize 
risk assessment methods and make sure that risks related to machineries are assessed 
systematically. 
The research identified safety deficiencies and hazards occurring especially within rotat-
ing elements of the machinery. The solutions to make these areas safer were mainly to 
improve the safeguards. Earlier studies have revealed that users of the machine might 
even defeat safeguarding if it makes their work easier (Backström & Döös 2000), even 
though it can be extremely dangerous and harmful for their own and their colleagues’ 
health. Therefore, it is important to take into account all aspects that can affect the de-
sign of working conditions and the safety of machinery. This research pointed out one 
method to combine several different aspects and conduct such information. The used 
method is useful in bringing up the experience from users and achieving a more com-
prehensive design for the modernization of the machinery. The method is transferable to 
other industries and machineries where human–machine interface exists. 
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APPENDIX A: OPEN QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PERSONNEL 
 
 
 
1 
APPENDIX B: APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT DECREE (12.6.2008/403) 
Section of the Decree Requirement (citations from unofficial translation) Are requirements complied with? 
Section 2: Choosing work 
equipment, and its placement 
Employers must, for the employees’ use, choose safe work 
equipment that is suitable for the work and the working con-
ditions. The dimensions and strength of work equipment 
must correspond to the demands of the work. Work equip-
ment must not be burdened or stressed in a way that creates 
any hazard. 
Partly.  
The analyzed machine complies with 
the requirements. Closer inspection for 
other possible and additional work 
equipment are included in risk assess-
ment in Appendix C.  
Section 2: Choosing work 
equipment, and its placement 
While using work equipment, the working posture and loca-
tion of employees using the equipment, as well as ergonomic 
principles, must be taken fully into account. 
Yes. 
Section 2: Choosing work 
equipment, and its placement 
It must be especially ensured that there is space enough to 
use the work equipment, and that the energy or substance 
used or produced by the work equipment can be safely trans-
ferred. Falls and movements of the equipment causing dan-
ger must be prevented by securing the work equipment or 
some other way. 
Partly. Closer inspection for guards of 
mechanical energy transfer is included 
in risk assessment in Appendix C. 
Section 3: Instructions for 
use of work equipment 
When there are no manufacturer’s instructions available, the 
instructions must be supplemented, or new instructions must 
be drawn up when necessary. The instructions must be kept 
up to date. The instructions must be available and under-
standable for all employees concerned. Before new work or 
a work phase is started, it must be ensured that the employee 
can follow the instructions. 
Partly. 
 
2 
Section of the Decree Requirement (citations from unofficial translation) Are requirements complied with? 
Section 4: Assessment and 
elimination of risks 
The employer must systematically analyse and evaluate the 
safety of the work equipment. This has to be done especially 
in connection with changes in production or work methods. 
When carrying out the evaluation, attention must be paid to 
the hazards and risks caused by the work equipment and its 
moving parts, external structure, physical and chemical 
properties, automatic functions, electricity, and other hazards 
and risks caused by the work and working conditions. If the 
use of the equipment causes any hazard or risk, the employer 
must immediately take any necessary measures to eliminate 
the hazard or risk. 
Yes. However, the closer inspection 
for risks originating from the analyzed 
area of the machine is in risk assess-
ment in Appendix C. 
Section 5: Ensuring the func-
tional condition of work 
equipment 
Any work equipment must be kept safe throughout its whole 
operational life by regular service and maintenance. Any 
hazard or risk caused by failure, damage or wear must be 
eliminated. The control system and safety devices must 
function faultlessly. 
Yes. However, these requirements are 
partly included in risk assessment in 
Appendix C. 
Section 5: Ensuring the func-
tional condition of work 
equipment 
The employer must continuously monitor the working order 
of the work equipment by carrying out inspections, tests, 
measurements, and using other suitable ways. A qualified 
person that is familiar with the structure and use of the work 
equipment can carry out the inspection and testing necessary 
to ensure the working order of the work equipment. 
Yes. 
Section 6: Properties of 
guards and safety devices 
Any guards and safety devices of work equipment must in a 
reliable and appropriate way protect against that risk or those 
risks against which they have been installed. 
Partly. These requirements are includ-
ed in risk assessment in Appendix C. 
 
3 
Section of the Decree Requirement (citations from unofficial translation) Are requirements complied with? 
Section 6: Properties of 
guards and safety devices 
The guards and safety devices must: 
1) be of solid construction; 
2) not give rise to any additional hazard; 
3) not be easily removed or rendered inoperative; 
4) be situated at a sufficient distance from the danger zone; 
5) not restrict more than necessary the view of the operating 
area of the equipment; and 
6) they must allow the measures referred to in section 12: 
Safety of maintenance work. 
Partly. These requirements are includ-
ed in risk assessment in Appendix C. 
Section 7: Warning devices 
and markings 
Work equipment must bear the warning devices and warn-
ings and markings essential to ensure the safety of employ-
ees. Warnings and markings on work equipment must be 
unambiguous and easily perceivable and understandable. 
Partly. These requirements are includ-
ed in risk assessment in Appendix C. 
Section 8: Control devices 
and control systems 
Control devices must be located outside danger zones, ex-
cept for certain control devices that necessarily have to be 
used inside a danger zone. In that case, other measures have 
to be used to ensure that the use of the control devices does 
not cause any danger. Control devices must be protected in a 
way that prevents their unintended use. 
Yes. 
 
4 
Section of the Decree Requirement (citations from unofficial translation) Are requirements complied with? 
Section 8: Control devices 
and control systems 
Control devices of work equipment that affect safety must be 
clearly visible and identifiable, and appropriately marked. 
Yes. 
Section 8: Control devices 
and control systems 
Control systems must be reliable and they must, if possible, 
be secured in such a way that their failure or a change in 
their energy level does not cause any danger. The control 
systems must be chosen taking into account of the deficien-
cies, malfunctions and restrictions that are likely to occur in 
their intended operating conditions. 
Yes. 
Section 9: Starting the work 
equipment 
It must not be possible to start work equipment by any other 
means but by deliberate action on a control device provided 
for the purpose. 
Yes. 
Section 9: Starting the work 
equipment 
Before starting the work equipment the operator must be 
able to ensure, from the main control position, that no person 
is present in the danger zones. If this is not possible, (contin-
ues---) 
 
Yes. 
 
  
5 
Section of the Decree Requirement (citations from unofficial translation) Are requirements complied with? 
Section 10: Stopping the 
work equipment, and emer-
gency stop 
All work equipment must be equipped with a control to stop 
it completely and safely. 
Each workstation must be fitted with a control to stop some 
or all of the work equipment, so that the equipment is in a 
safe state. The stop control of the equipment must have pri-
ority over the start controls. When the work equipment or 
the dangerous parts of it have stopped, the energy supply to 
those devices must stop. 
Where appropriate and depending on the hazards the equip-
ment presents and its normal stopping time, work equipment 
must be fitted with an emergency stop device. 
Partly. These requirements are includ-
ed in risk assessment in Appendix C. 
Section 11: Isolation from 
energy sources 
Work equipment must be fitted with clearly identifiable de-
vices to isolate it from all its energy sources. When neces-
sary, the devices must be lockable. When the energy supply 
has been switched off, it must be possible to remove the en-
ergy stored in the work equipment in a way that does not 
cause any danger. 
Yes. 
Section 12: Safety of mainte-
nance work 
In connection with installation, service, repair and other 
maintenance work, the employer must ensure that 
1) the employee has received enough information, training 
and guidance concerning special circumstances;  
Yes. 
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Section of the Decree Requirement (citations from unofficial translation) Are requirements complied with? 
Section 12: Safety of mainte-
nance work 
2) when necessary, the persons representing the employer 
and carrying the responsibility for the work have accepted 
the work to be carried out and given their permission to 
begin the work; 
Yes. 
Section 12: Safety of mainte-
nance work 
3) any arrangements and measurements necessary for the 
safety of the work have been carried out in the workplace; 
Yes. 
Section 12: Safety of mainte-
nance work 
4) any pressure and flow of gas and fluids have been 
switched off; 
Yes. 
Section 12: Safety of mainte-
nance work 
5) electric tension has been switched off; Yes. 
Section 12: Safety of mainte-
nance work 
6) the load on lifting machinery has been secured in such a 
way that a failure of the machinery cannot cause any danger; 
Yes. 
Section 12: Safety of mainte-
nance work 
7) starting work equipment under repair has been prevented 
in a reliable way during the repair work, if the employee is 
situated in the danger zone; 
Yes. 
Section 12: Safety of mainte-
nance work 
8) the work equipment in use is in order and suitable for the 
intended purpose; 
Yes. 
Section 12: Safety of mainte-
nance work 
9) it has been taken care of that dangerous substances or lack 
of oxygen do not cause any danger during work in tanks or 
enclosed places;  
Yes. 
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Section of the Decree Requirement (citations from unofficial translation) Are requirements complied with? 
Section 12: Safety of mainte-
nance work 
10) appropriate personal protective equipment, instruments 
and other equipment are used; 
Yes. 
Section 12: Safety of mainte-
nance work 
11) sufficient arrangements have been made to ensure the 
stability and carrying capacity of scaffolds, work platforms 
and ladders; 
Yes. 
Section 12: Safety of mainte-
nance work 
12) any unnecessary access to the danger area has been pre-
vented. 
Yes. 
Section 14: Special compe-
tence requirements 
Drivers of devices for lifting persons must have a written 
permit given by the employer to carry out the work. Before 
giving the permit, the employer must ensure that the driver 
has sufficient ability and skills to use the work equipment. 
Yes. 
Section 26: Guard structures 
and equipment preventing 
falls 
Guard structures and equipment preventing falls must have 
such strength that they, as effectively as possible, prevent 
persons from falling or stop their falling. Rails and other 
general safety structures against falls must be continuous, 
except for any access leading to ladders or stairways. 
Partly. These requirements are includ-
ed in risk assessment in Appendix C. 
Section 30: Use and placing 
of ladders 
Ladders must be used in such a way that the employees con-
cerned can all the time hold them safely and get a safe sup-
port. Manual carrying of loads must not prevent maintaining 
a safe hold onto the ladder. Leaning ladders must not be used 
as work platform. 
Partly. There is a low A-ladder in use 
which lack of handrail. These re-
quirements are included in risk as-
sessment in Appendix C. 
   
8 
Section of the Decree Requirement (citations from unofficial translation) Are requirements complied with? 
Section 30: Use and placing 
of ladders 
Ladders must be placed in such a way that they stand steadi-
ly during the use. Movable ladders must stand on a stable, 
durable, immobile base of appropriate size, so that the rungs 
remain in horizontal position. Suspended ladders must be 
attached safely and, except for rope ladders, in such a way 
that they cannot move or swing. 
Yes. 
Section 30: Use and placing 
of ladders 
The risk of movable ladders falling or their legs sliding must 
be prevented by fastening their upper or lower end, using a 
device against sliding, or by some other means similarly 
effective. The ladders must be so tall that they extend far 
enough above the level to be reached, if a safe hold cannot 
be guaranteed by any other measures. Lockable multi-
element combined ladders and extendable ladders must be 
used in such a way that the steps, limiters, joints and locking 
hooks remain strong and durable in the working conditions, 
and that the parts cannot move in relation to each other. 
Ladders on wheels must be placed in an immobile position 
before stepping on them. 
Yes. 
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APPENDIX C: RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
Se Fr Pr Av Cl Risk
Operation 
and 
maintenance 
(machine is 
ON)
Task A, phase 2 
failing: the product 
sticks to the doctor 
blade
Mechanical 
hazard, 
rotating 
elements
Access and 
contact with 
rotating 
elements, 
helping the 
product by 
additional 
work 
equipment
Injury to hand Task 
requires 
access and 
visibility to 
the area
2 3 3 1 7
Acceptabl
e
Usage of additional 
work equipment 
should be safe 
(action X needed 
concerning 
safeguards)
Action X Ok Ok
Foreseeable 
misuse: When task 
A, phase 2 is 
failing, it is possible 
that operator uses 
his hand 
thoughtlessly close 
to the machine
Mechanical 
hazard, 
rotating 
elements
Access and 
contact with 
rotating 
elements, 
taking the 
product by 
hand
Injury to hand 2 3 3 3 9
Safety 
measures 
recomme
nded
Access should be 
denied with guards
Guard Ok Ok
Controlling the 
handle of the 
system Y within the 
task B
Mechanical 
hazard, 
rotating 
elements 
and sharp 
edges
Access and 
contact with 
rotating 
elements and 
sharp edges
Injury to hand Task 
requires 
access and 
visibility to 
the area
3 5 2 1 8
Safety 
measures 
required
The control handle 
should be moved 
further away from 
the machine and 
located also 
outside of future 
guard
Guard. 
Relocating the 
control handle 
outside of 
guard
Ok Ok
Observing the 
tightness of the web
Mechanical 
hazard, 
rotating 
elements
Access and 
contact with 
rotating 
elements
Injury to hand Task 
requires 
visibility to 
the area
2 4 3 1 8 Safety 
measures 
recomme
nded
Safeguard with 
visibility
Guard with 
visibility
Ok Ok
Assessment Proposed 
solution/ 
Action required
Valid
ation
Planned 
corrective 
actions
Verifi
cation
Require-
ments of 
the task
Phase of 
lifecycle of 
machine
Task
Origin of 
hazard
Hazardous 
event
Potential 
consequences, 
harm
2 
 
Se Fr Pr Av Cl Risk
Operation and 
maintenance 
(machine is OFF)
Cleaning task 
1, (access 
from the place 
x)
Mechanical 
hazards, sharp 
edges
Access and 
working near 
to sharp 
edges
Injury to 
hand
Task 
requires 
access to 
the hatch
2 3 2 1 6
Accep
table
No action Ok Ok
Cleaning task 
1, (access 
from the place 
x)
High 
temperature
Contact with 
parts with high 
temperature
Injury to 
hand
Task 
requires 
access to 
the hatch
2 3 2 1 6
Accep
table
Information for use: 
warning sign of hot 
surface already 
exists; checking the 
cleaning instruction 
that it mentions to 
wait until the 
temperature has 
lowered before 
performing the task
Ok Ok Ok
Cleaning the 
whole machine 
in general
Hazards are 
assessed within 
each cleaning 
task separately
Tasks 
require 
access, so 
all guards 
have to be 
able to 
0 Guards should be 
removed as simply 
as possible: one 
tool for all screw 
(e.g. 19 mm) etc
New guards will 
be uniform and 
removing them 
is planned to be 
applicable
Ok Ok
Se Fr Pr Av Cl Risk
Applicable 
requirements of 
Machinery Decree 
(12.6.2008/400) based 
on the Appendix B: 
Applicable safety 
requi-rements of 
Government Decree 
(12.6.2008/403)
1.2.4.3. 
Hätäpysäytys
Stopping the 
work 
equipment, 
and 
emergency 
stop
Koneessa on 
oltava yksi tai 
useampia 
hätäpysäytyslaitt
eita, joiden 
avulla todellinen 
tai uhkaava 
vaara voidaan 
torjua.
Incapability to 
stop the 
machine in 
case of 
emergency 
might be 
possible on a 
certain place
0 To add emergency 
stop device, near 
miss finding 
reported
To add 
emergency stop 
device
Ok Ok
Planned 
corrective 
actions
Verifi
cation
Valida
tion
Planned 
corrective 
actions
Verifi
cation
Valida
tion
Assessment Proposed 
solution/ 
Action required
Statutory safety 
requirements
Section/ 
subsection
Literal 
citation
Hazard, 
hazardous 
event
Potential 
conseque
nces, 
harm
Requirem
ents of 
the task
Assessment Proposed 
solution/ 
Action required
Task
Origin of 
hazard
Hazardous 
event
Potential 
conseque
nces, 
harm
Requirem
ents of 
the task
Phase of lifecycle 
of machine
